THREE  SCOTCH  RHETORICIANS  OF  THE 
EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY 

KAMES,  CAMPBELL,  AND  BLAIR 


By 

GORDON  RANDOLPH  CRECRAFT 

A.  B.  Miami  University,  1918 


THESIS 

SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 
FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  MASTER  OF  ARTS  IN  ENGLISH 
IN  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS,  1922 


URBANA,  ILLINOIS 


\°J  L \*  ** 


' 


■ 


TABLE  OF  COUTE1JTS . 


Pages. 

Chapter  I.  The  Revival  of  Letters  in 

Eighteenth-Century  Scotland  ------  1 - 12 

Cliapter  II.  Karnes  and  his  Element s of 

Criticism.  --------------  IS-  4 3 

Chapter  III. Blair  and  his  Lectures ------  — 44-68 

Chapter  IV.  Campbell  and  his  Phi  lose  \A-~j 

of  Rhetoric . -------------  69-87 

Chapter  V.  Recapitulation  and  Interpretation.-  - - 88-95 

Bibliography  --------------------94-95 


THE  REVIVAL  OE  LETTERS  III  El GHTEEITTH- 
CEiTTURY  SCOTLAND. 

CHAPTER  I. 

In  this  year,  1754,  I remember  nothing  remarkable  in 
the  General  Assembly.  But  this  w as  the  year  in  'which  the  Select 
Society  was  established,  which  improved  and  gave  a name  to  the 
literati  of  this  country,  then  beginning  to  distinguish  them- 
selves. (1) 

oo  states  the  Reverend  Dr.  Alexander  Carlyle  in  his 
Autobiography.  The  italics  of  the  word  literati  are  Dr.  Carlyle Ts 
own;  but  they  must  do  double  duty  and  serve  as  mine,  also,  for 
it  is  toward  this  word  literati  that  I wish  to  direct  attention. 

The  place  is  Edinburgh,  Scotland.  The  time,  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  dramatis  personae  are  self- 
confessed  literati . Eor  some  hundreds  of  years  past,  Scotland  has 
had  her  men  of  literature,  law,  and  divinity,  but  the  app  earance 
of  this  new  species,  these  literary  cognoscenti,  ’’then  beginning 
to  distinguish  themselves”,  is  a new  phenomenon,  inviting  scrutiny, 
’.'/hence  came  they?  Who  are  they?  bhy  do  they  appear  now,  and  not 
until  now?  A survey  of  Scottish  literature  up  to  this  point  would 
scarcely  lead  us  to  anticipate  their  advent.  As  Hr.  Gregory  Smith 
expresses  it: 

The  Scottish  Muse  lias  been  charged  with  three  serious 
breaches  of  "decorum",  each  serious  enough  to  damn  her  higher  hopes 

(1)  Ed.  I860,  r.  296. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2015 


https  ://arch  i ve . o rg/detai  Is/th  reescotch  rhetoOOcrec 


-2- 


of  Parnassus.  She  has  been  called  provincial,  by  which  is  ne  ant 
no  mere  contrast  with  English  or  other  standards,  but  a certain 
frumpishness  or  village -habit  that  goes  badly  with  her  national 
pretence.  It  has  been  said  of  her  that  often  in  taste  and  lan- 
guage she  shows  an  unblushing  defiance  of  the  graces  and  propriet- 
ies. She  has  been  blamed  for  being  tediously  reminiscent  of 
family  matters  and  neighbor- folk,  of  living'  too  much  in  the 
past  and  in  her  own  past.  Briefly,  the  indictment  is  that  she  is 
provincial  (even  parochial),  rough  mannered,  and  antiquarian.  (1) 

How  certainly  these  are  no  qualities  from  which  we 
might  expect  the  formation  of  a Select  Society  of  literati . Yet 
"Jupiter”  Carlyle  was  not  claiming  for  himself  and  his  contempora- 
ries of  Edinburgh  a title  refused  to  them  by  the  rest  of  the  re- 
public of  letters.  The  mid-eighteenth  century  found  the  literary 
reputation  of  Edinburgh  decidedly  ” loo king- up " . And  although 
the  capital  of  Scotland  took  unto  herself  and  appropriated  to 
her  own  glory  most  of  the  talent  and  genius  of  her  dominions,  yet 
11  Scotland  shared  to  an  extent  in  the  revival  of  letters.  Glasgow 
and  Aberdeen  aspired  in  their  own  right  to  honorable  mention  among 
the  centers  of  culture;  and  if  Edinburgh  boasted  of  her  Robertson, 
her  Smith,  and  her  Hume,  Glasgow  pointed  with  pride  to  her  Si ms on, 
(2),  her  Leechman,  (S),  and  --  greater  than  either  of  these  --  her 
Hutcheson,  "whose  fame"  as  Carlyle  tells  us,  "had  filled  the  Col- 
lege with  students  of  philosophy."  (4)  As  for  Aberdeen,  she  had, 
among  others,  her  Principal  George  Campbell,  whose  Philosophy 

(l)  Scottish  literature,  Character  and  Influence,  1919. 

{ - ) Robert  Sims  on.  Professor  of  Mathematics  at  Glasgow,  Vide 
Carlyle’s  Autobiography . 

(5)  William  Leechman,  Professor  of  Divinity  at  Glasgow,  and  after- 
wards head  of  the  University. 

(4)  Aut ob i ogr a phy , p.  82. 


. 


. 


standard 


of  Rhetoric  has  lasted  almost  down  to  our  own  times  as  a 
text,  and  has  been  called  "by  far  the  most  valuable  contribution 
to  criticism  which  came  from  Scotland  during  the  century";  (l) 
though  of  that,  more  later. 

But  — to  return  to  our  original  question  --  whence 
came  this  new  breed  of  cognoscenti?  The  answer  is  that  Scotland 
(inveterate  borrower  that  she  has  always  been!)  has  been  again  to 
London  --  and  for  the  third  time.  On  her  first  visit  in  the 
person  of  the  first  Janes  she  borrowed  ban  Chaucer,  and  from  her 
delighted  disciple ship  to  this  master  there  cane  the  Golden  Age  of 
Scottish  Poetry.  Later,  when  this  impulse  had  died  out  and  the 
Scottish  Muse  strove  mightily,  yet  f all  her  striving  attained 
but  feeble  expression,  there  came  a new  breath  of  life  from  the 
south;  and  Scottish  bards  tunned  Elizabethan  court  poets,  tile 
Scottish  prose  gave  ground  end  melted  before  the  Anglicani zing 
influence  from  within  and  without. 

How  for  the  third  time  Scotland  has  been  to  London; 
and  this  time  she  has  returned  home  "Augustan" . She  has  brought 
bad:  with  her.  Pope,  Addison,  an!  Swift ; she  lias  breathed- in  the 
atmosphere  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  has  carried  home  the 
passion  for  explaining  things;  yea,  more,  she  might  have  made  a 
clean  sweep  of  it  and  carried  off  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson,  himself, 

( 1 ) J.  H.  Millar,  .1  Literary  History  of  Scotland,  1901,  p.S58. 


-4- 


we  are,  of  course,  still  ini  nr  our  metaphor  — had  not  that 

worthy  proved  so  erratic  and.  unceremonious  in  his  dealings  with  Scots, 
that  some  were  cowed  into  mingled  respect  and  fear,  while  others 
were  goaded  into  saying  with  Lord  Monboddo  that  he  was  "neither  a 
scholar  nor  a man  of  taste."  (l)  Yet  for  all  this,  Samuel  did 
patch  up  a truce  with  the  Scots,  and  after  a time,  possibly  grown 
curious  about  the  spread  of  classicism  among  them,  lumbered  off  to 
Edinburgh  to  see  abo ut  it. 

The  Union  of  the  British  and  Scottish  Parliaments  (1707) 
marks  the  beginning  of  the  peaceful  invasion  of  England  by  Scottish 
adventurers.  Professional  and  business  men,  unable  to  find  adequate 
opportunities  for  their  abilities  at  home,  , armed  down  upon  London 
and  competed  with  the  Englishman  in  his  own  fields.  Lawyers, 
doctors,  men  of  letters,  publishers,  — there  was  scarcely  an  oc- 
cupation  which  escaped  invasion.  Add  to  this  the  fact  that  Scots 
in  increasing  numbers  began  attending  English  schools  and  universities 
(£)  and  it  will  be  apparent  that  the  union  of  the  two  countries 
could  not  long  remain  a union  in  government  only.  The  Scot  was 
eager,  proud,  assertive;  but  he  was  also  awed.  It  his  pro- 

vincialism keenly,  and  partly  as  a matter  of  pride,  partly  as  a 

(1)  James  Burnett,  Lore  Monboddo,  C r 1 B 7 a , 

1789,  gf  p.  271. 

(E)  Erancis  Jeffery  and  Adam  Smith,  among  others.  Hume  advised  tint 

his  nephews  should  be  sent  to  Eton,  chiefly  to 
avoid  the  risks  of contracting  Boots  accent. 


-o- 


matter  of  policy,  lie 
there  was  no  question 
As  might  he 
lead  in  this  national 


set  about  he 
of  England's 
expected,  the 
determination 


task  of  becoming  English,  since 
becoming  Scottish. 

Scottish  Universities  tools  the 
to  be  as  English  as  the  Engl  is 


h 


Says  Professor  Millar  in  his  Scottish  Prose  of  the  seventeenth  mx 
eighteenth  centuries : 

mother  phenomenon  in  the  Scottish  aufkl&rung,  if  the 
dantic  expression  may  be  pardoned,  is  the  emerging  of  out 
Universities  from  a condition  of  comparative  obscurity  into 
the  full  blaze  of  European  celebrity.  A condition  precedent 
of  this  fortunate  transition  was  the  establishment  of  the 
professorial  monopoly  which  in  the  following  century  was  to  be 
so  fiercely  attached.  It  was  the  same  alihe  in  Arts  and  sciences. 
The  chairs  were  filled  by  first-rate  men  whose  lectures,  it 
was  a,  pleasure  to  listen  to,  and  who  exerted  an  influence  which 
extended  far  beyond  their  respective  classrooms. 

But,  he  adds,  the  movement  was  by  no  means  confined  to  the  uni- 
versities : 

The  awakening  of  the  Universities,  too,  was  but  one 
manifestation  of  the  general,  revival  of  intellectual  interest 
among  the  educated  classes.  It  is  difficult  for  us  to  under- 
stand the  enthusiasm  with  which  grown-up  men  flung  themselves 
into  the  struggle  for  knowledge,  and  debated  in  quasi- social 
gatherings  vexed  questions  of  philosophy  and  metaphysics. 

Eor  was  the  zeal  for  improvement  confined  to  merely  spequ. - 
lative  matters.  Art,  manufactures,  and  agriculture  partook 
handsomely  of  the  benefits  which  the  mental  activity  of  the  age 
brought  in  its  train,  lien  of  considerable  powers  and  marked 
aptitude  for  academic  discussion  devoted  their  leisure  to 
planting  trees,  and  to  making  two  blades  of  corn  grow  where 
only  one  had  brown  before.  fl) 


(1)  pp.  176  - 177 


. 


- ci- 


In  this  general  revival  of  letters,  arts , and  sciences, 
the  most  important  point  for  consideration  here,  is  the  complete 
abandonment  of  the  Scottish  dialect  as  the  language  of  the  learned, 
and  the  substitution  of  -English.  Through  a determination  to  write 
and  speak  nothing  but  the  King*s  English,  these  Scottish  li ter at i 
were  led  to  an  unceasing  study  of  the  "best  English  models.'1  Hot 
satisfied  with  this  alone,  they  felt  impelled  to  try  their  hands 
at  reformulating  the  critical  canons  thus  obtained,  and  out  of 
these  efforts  came,  among  others,  the  three  works  which  are  treat- 
ed at  some  length  in  succeeding  chapters  of  this  paper.  The 
efforts  of  Karnes,  flair  and  Campbell  (l)  have  been  selected  for 
this  special  treatment,  not  because  they  are  more  typical  of 
this  movement,  but  because  they  are  the  most  ambitious  and  formal 
attempts  to  treat  fully  of  rhetoric  and  criticism.  Furthermore, 
there  is  apparent  in  these  three  a direct  kinship.  To  what 
Karnes  laid  down  as  the  e lenient s of  criticism,  Blair  and  Campbell 
acquiesced;  £ind  although  the  int  nts  and  purposes  of  the  two 
latter  are  certainly  divergent,  they  owe  a common  debt  to  the 
Elements  of  Critic  ism  (2),  in  which,  it  is  scarcely  too  much  to 
say,  they  have  their  origin. 

(1)  Henry  Home,  Lord  Karnes,  1696  - 1782;  Life  by  A.  Eraser  Tytle  i 
2 vols . 1807.  Hugh  Blair,  minister  of  High  Church  and  first  pro- 
fessor of  Rhetoric  and  Belles-Lettres,  University  of  Edinburgh, 
1718  - 1800;  Life  by  John  Hill',  IS'-A  ; also  Life  by  Einlayson, 
appended  to  31a i r 1 s S e rrn ons  , London,  1801,  vol.  b.  George  Camp- 
bell, Principal  of  Uarischal  College,  Aberdeen,  1719  - 1796. 

Life  in  L ic ti onary  of  Rational  Biography . 

(2)  1762,  Henr  77  Home.  Lor/  If^e  s . 


-7- 


Postponing  for  a time  oar  consideration  of  these  three, 
let  us  note  the  activities  of  some  of  their  contemporaries. 

The  first  thing  which  strikes  the  student  is  the  intense  eager- 
ness of  all  professions  to  acquaint  themselves  and  their  brethren 
with  the  principles  of  English  composition  and  criticism.  Lawyers, 
philosophers,  historians,  political-economists,  preachers,  and 
printers  --  all  try  their  hands  at  it.  David  Hume  displaying 
his  philosophic  acuteness  and  his  erudition  at  one  and  the  same 
time,  composed  an  Essay  on  Tragedy.  Lor  his  own  benefit  and  that 
of  his  friends  he  compiled  a list  of  Scotticisms  to  be  carefully 
avoided.  (1)  Adam  Smith  (remembered  for  his  Wealth  of  ITati  ons ) 
as  early  as  1746  gave  a course  of  lectures  in  Edinburgh  upon 
English  Literature;  a private  speculation  of  his  own  which  met 
with  a large  measure  of  success.  A paper  on  JohnsonTs  Dictionary 
in  the  ill-fated  Edinburgh  Review  of  1755  (2)  is  further  indica- 
tive of  his  interest  in  the  English  language,  and  bits  of  his 
literary  criticism  found  their  way  into  his  Theory  of  Moral 
Sentiments  (1759)  (5).  James  Beattie,  author  of  The  Minstrel 
and  usually  associated  with  Reid  and  Oswald  in  the  "Common  Sense" 
school  of  philosophers,  is  responsible  for  an  anonymous  little 
volume,  published  in  1787,  on  Scotticisms . arranged  in  alpha— 

( lT  Vide  Hume,  Philosophical  Works,  ed  Green  and  Grose, 1875,  4 p. 

461 . 

(2)  But  two  numbers  appeared. 

(Z)  Wordsworth  planes  him  with  Hume  as  a critic,  and  summarily 
disposes  of  the  claims  of  both.  V id e , Wo r d swo r t h T s Literary 
Cri  t ici  srn,  ed.  H.  0.  Smith,  London,  1905,  p 178,  Ho  te  2. 


-8- 


betical  order , designed  to  correct  improorieti es  of  speech  and 
writ ina . ( 1 ) 

Nor  are  the  literati  content  with  the  mere  conquest  of 
English  prose.  Not  only  will  they  write  histories,  law-books, 
philosopies,  and  rhetorics,  hut  to  the  great  perturbation  of  some 
of  their  own  number  they  will  write  plays,  and  worse  still,  will 
produce  them  at  Edinburgh.  There  are  few  more  amusing  incidents 
of  this  period  than  the  furor  that  beset  the  church  party  when 
John  Home’s  Douglas  was  acted  ih  the  old  Scottish  capital.  ,T Jupiter 
Carlyle  relates  the  matter  with  great  gusto,  and  it  is  clear  that 
he  extracted  much  enjoyment  from  the  ludicrous  discomfort  of  some 
of  his  "belletristic”  friends  who  scrupled  not  to  treat  "elegantly" 
of  the  drama  in  criticism,  but  dared  not  show  their  faces  within 
a theatre.  (2) 

There  is  great  temptation  to  linger  over  the  many  ac- 
counts of  the  lives  and  doings  of  the  polished  society  of  old 
Edinburgh.  No  period  in  any  literature  has  been  better  served 


(1)  J.  H.  Millar,  Literary  History  of  Scotland,  p 519. 

(2)  Autobiography,  p 525;  "Lrs.  Hobertson  andBlair,  though  they 
both  visited  this  great  actress  (Mrs.  Siddons)  in  private,  often 
regretted  to  me  that  they  had  not  seized  the  opportunity  which 
was  given  them,  by  her  superior  talents  and  unexceptionable 
character,  of  going  openly  to  the  theatre,  which  would  have  put 
an  end  to  all  future  animadversions  on  the  subject.  This  condrnt 
of  theirs  was  keeping  the  reserve  of  their  own  imaginary  irnporr— 

"fence  to  the  last;  and  their  regretting  it  was  very  just,  for  by 
that  time  they  got  no  credit  for  their  abstinence,  and  the 
struggle  between  the  liberal  and  the  restrained  and  affected  man- 
ners of  the  clergy  had  been  long  at  an  end,  by  my  having  finally 
stood  my  ground,  and  been  well  supported  by  so  great  a majority 
in  the  Church.” 


-9- 


by  its  annalists.  (l) 

But  enough  lias  been  said  to  prepare  us  for  consideration 
of  our  subject  proper;  the  formal  treatment  of  rhetoric  and 
1 it e r a ry  criticis m in  the  \ /or k s o f Karne s , .3lai r and  Campb el  1 . ( 2 ) 

The  history  of  Bhetoric  from  Aristotle  to  the  eighteenth 
century  is  a record  of  interpretations,  re- interpretations , mut- 
ilations, subversions  --  and  sometimes,  in  the  Aristotelian  sense 
of  the  term  (B)  --  almost  anihiliation.  Briefly,  the  tendency 
has  been  to  divorce  composition  from  what  Aristotle  had  held  to  be 

(1)  Besides  Carlyle’s  Autobi ograpliy  there  are  the  I.lemoirs  of  Hume, 

Beid,  Robertson,  and  Dug  ild  - art . Th  Tytler*  emoirs 

of  Kames  and  Herr’s  Memoirs  o f Karnes ’ s printer,  Mr.  William  Smellie, 
etc . 

(2)  Some  mention  should  be  made  of  James  Burnett,  lord  Monboddo 
(1714-1790).  A man  of  deep  and  extensive  learning,  with  pro- 
round acquaintance  with,  the  classics  and  metaphysics,  he  was 
nevertheless  so  eccentric  in  his  likes  and  dislikes,  and  so  un- 
compromising’ in  devotion  to  certain  pet  theories,  that  he  was 
seldom  taken  seriously  by  his  own  contemporaries.  His  Origin 
and  Progress  o f Language , 6 volumes,  appeared  in  1789.  The 
primary  idea  of  this  work  was  that,  for  all  philosophic  truth, 

we  must  go  back  to  Plato  and  Aristotle.  It  opens  with  an  accou  t 
of  the  origin  of  Ideas  (according  to  Plato  and  Aristotle)  next 
of  the  origin  of  Human  Society,  and  next  of  language,  language, 
it  is  maintained,  is  a human  invention;  man  was  originally  an 
animal  without  speech  or  reason  or  affection.  Orang-outangs  are 
asserted  to  be  not  specially  distinct  from  men,  and  on  the  author- 
ity of  the  traveller's  tales,  Monboddo  vouches  for  the  existence, 
in  Ms  day,  of  men  with  tails;  he  insists  that  all  the  higher 
attainments  of  the  human  race  were  the  mere  results  of  long  ex- 
perience, continuous  struggle,  and  artifice.  After  his  history 
of  the  ’’rise  and  progress”  of  languages  in  general  and  critical 
comparisons  of  various  languages,  he  devotes  his  sixth  volume 
to  the  subject  of  rhetoric.  The  work  was  intended  to  rival  the 
Elements  o f Criticism,  by  Karnes,  but  it  goes  a great  deal  farther; 
there  is  a curious  anticipation  of  the  Darwinian  theory  of  evolu- 
tion. This  last  idea  of  man  monkeys  seems  to  have  shocked  his _ con- 
temporaries more  than  any  one  other  eccentricity  of  His  lordship. 


-10- 


the  soul  of  Rhetoric , its  speculative  and  philosophic  character. 

The  art  of  thinking  was  forgotten  in  the  art  of  sp  eaking.  Rhetor- 
ical devices,  tropes,  figures,  mere  ornaments  of  style,  received 
undue  attention;  were  standardized,  in  fact.  Every  one  who  has 
written  upon  the  subject  has  quoted  Hud i bras  (l)  upon  the  value 
of  such  practice.  Sir  Thomas  Wilson's  .'art  o f Rhetoric  (1552)  af- 
fords instance  of  this  mechanical  scheme  for  avoiding  the  fatigue 
of  thinking;  he  advocates  "a  gorgeous  beautifying  of  the  tongue 
with  borrowed  words  and  change  of  sentence.”  Figures,  he  tells 
us,  should  not  be  "equally  sparioled  about  the  whole  oration,  but 
so  dissevered  and  parted  as  stars  stand  in  the  firmament,  or 
flowers  in  a garden,  or  pretty  devised  antiques  in  a cloth  of 
Arras . " 

This  preoccupation  with  diction  lasted  in  England  well 
up  to  the  eighteenth  century.  It  was  not  to  be  expected,  then, 
that  ocotland  should  wholly  escape  it,  and  for  the  further  reason 
that  we  have  seen  how  anxious  was  all  Scotland  concerning  correct 
English  diction.  Happily,  however,  another  consideration  operated 
to  prevent  undue  extravagances  in  this  direction,  at  least  upon 
the  part  of  those  who  laid  down  the  rules  for  their  brethren . 

(1)  Canto  I.  part  I.,  11  89  - 90;  — "For  all  a rhetoricians  rules 

Teach  nothing  but  to  name  his  tools". 


■ 


-11- 


Emphasize  diction  most  of  them  did,  hut  after  the  manner  of  phil- 
osophers. The  taste  for  metaphysics  and  philosophy  seems  to  he  the 
3cot3T  heritage;  and  partly  because  the  task  was  so  thoroughly 
enjoyable  to  them,  partly  because  they  recognized  its  true  v;  lue , 
they  set  about  grounding  their  canons  of  criticism  upon"true 
principles  of  taste."  Philosophy,  so  long  divorced  from 
Rhetoric,  was  re- wedded  to  it.  Hot  that  the  two  always  enjoyed 
the  happiest  wedlock.  Sometimes  (as  has  been  asserted  in  the 
case  of  Karnes  ( 1 ) ) Philosophy  seemed  to  assert  claims  to  the  great- 
er half  of  the  partnership.  -But  on  the  whole  the  re- 
sult was  desirable. 

But  from  another  danger  which  has  beset  the  art  of  Rhet- 
oric from  its  later  infancy,  these  B0otch  Rhetoricians  were  not 
so  successful  in  saving  it.  Rhetoric  was  not  considered  by  its 
founder,  nor  should  it  be  considered  by  anyone,  as  being  iden  - 
tieal  with  literary  appreciation.  Aristotle  wrote  upon  the  art  of 
Poetry  as  well  as  upon  the  art  of  Rhetor ic . Of  this  distinction 

(1)  Professor  Saintsbury,  History  of  Briticism  2.  p 465;  --  "Of 
course  this  excellent  Boots  lawyer  and  ingenious  ’Scotch  meta- 
physician 1 had  strong  precedents  to  urge  for  making  a muddle 
of  Moral  Philosophy  and  Literary  Briticism,  it  has  been  pointed 
out  that  Aristotle  is  not  a little  exposed  to  the  same  imputa- 
tion." 


> 


' 


-12- 


I shall  have  frequent  occasion  to  remind  the  reader  hereafter. 
Sufficient  for  the  moment  to  remark  that  of  the  three  men  treated 
in  succeed:'  , a hell  alone  seems  to  have  this  c ' bine-' 

tion  clearly  in  mind,  (l)  Sanies,  indeed  makes  no  pretense  to 
treating  formally  or  singly  of  the  art  of  rhetoric  ; the  nature 
of  his  task,  as  we  shall  see,  led  him  naturally  to  a considera- 
tion of  literature  as  a fine  art.  But  in  -Blair  Ts  lectures  upon 
his  profession  subject.  Belles-lettres  quite  overshadow  Rhetor i c 
and  the  Aristotelian  Art  is  as  effectually  swallowed  up  by 
literary  appreciation,  as  the  most  ardent  disciple  of  the  latter 
c ould  wi  sh . 


(1)  Bor  which,  along  with  general  praise  for  Ms  other  excellen  - 
cies,he  receives  mild  blame  from  Professor  Saintsbury.  As  I 
shall  refer  constantly  to  Professor  Saintsbury,  it  may  well  be 
stated  "in  the  deep  calm  of  a footnote"  that  in  the  opinion  of 
the  present  writer,  the  Professor's  criticisms  are  often  vitia  - 
ted  to  a certain  extent,  by  his  determination  to  bring  about  an 
exact  coincidence  between  literary  appreciati on  and  rhetoric . 

It  may  be  all  very  well  for  a man  to  dislike  and  distrust  the 
speculative  and  philosophical  character  of  the  art  of  Rhetoric 
but  that  is  a matter  of  opinion.  Certainly  his  opinion  should 
not  blirn  him  to  the  fact,  1 t,  if  in  i totle  there  appears 
a union  of  literary  and  philosophic  material,  Aristotle  was 
probably  aware  of  it,  and  intended  it  so. 


miES  AND  HIS  ELEMENTS  OE  CRITICISM. 


CHAPTER  II. 

Among  the  li  terat  i of  the  eighteenth- cent  "ary 
Edinburgh,  we  scarce  may  find  a more  interesting  and  striking 
figure  than  that  of  Henry  Home,  Lord  Kanes.  (1)  The  limits  pre- 
scribed for  this  discussion  will  restrict  consideration  of  his 
work  in  great  measure  to  his  place  in  the  history  of  rhetoric 
and  literary  criticism.  Yet  in  so  doing,  we  must  add  that  we 
are  considering  but  one  side  of  a many-sided  man;  nor  is  this 
statement,  in  spite  of  its  apparent  triteness,  unnecessary.  It 
is  precisely  because  Karnes,  more  than  most  of  his  contemporaries, 
was  so  many-sided,  that  his  rhetorical  and  critical  speculations 
acquire  special  interest.  Lawyer,  moral  philosopher,  historian, 
experimental  and  practical  agriculturalist,  he  could  not  write 
upon  the  subject  of  criticism,  or  indeed  upon  any  other  subject, 
without  bringing  to  his  work  something  from  each  of  his  many 
characters.  H,  as  has  been  said,  "he  occupied  eveiy  department 
of  human  thought  for  his  province,"  (£)  we  should  be  greatly 

( 1 ) Memoirs,  by  Alexander  Eraser  Tytler,  2 vols.  1807. 

( 2 ) Scottish  Prose  of  the  seventeenth  and  e ighteenth 

Centuries,  by  J.  H.  Millar,  1912. 


-14- 


surprised  if  his  omnisc ience  were  not  a basis  for  his  critical 
opinions. 

Henry  Home  was  born  at  Karnes,  in  the  county  of 
Berwick,  in  1696.  Descended  from  a family  whose  name  had  been 
highly  honorable  in  the  history  of  Scotland,  and  whose  estate 
had  once  been  considerable,  he  found  little  to  inherit  from  his 
fat  lie  r , George  Home,  except  the  family  name.  This  gentleman, 
a country  magistrate,  had  never  attended  University,  nor  had  he 
been  educated  for  any  profession.  Little  wonder,  then,  consider- 
ing the  state  of  higher  learning  in  the  country  at  that  time, 
that  George  Home  saw  no  necessity  for  burdening  himself  with  his 
son's  education,  further  than  to  engage  for  him  a private 
tutor,  and  when  this  course  of  training  was  completed,  to  ap- 
prentice him  in  1712  to  a Writer  to  the  Signet  in  Edinburgh. 

This  training  was  to  have  prepared  young  Home  for  the 
profession  of  a writer,  or  solicitor,  before  the  Supreme  G0urt, 
but  his  ambitions  grew  as  he  realized  how  much  more  affluence 
and  honor  might  be  his  if  he  were  to  become  a successful  advocate  . 
Immediately  he  turned  his  attention  to  acquiring  the  equivalent 
of  a University  education.  His  Latin  and  Greek  studies,  begun 
under  his  former  tutor,  .V  ingate,  were  resumed.  Independently  of 


» 


-15- 


any  tutor,  he  applied  himself  to  French,  Italiaa  , Mathematics, 
natural  Philosophy,  Logic,  ethics,  and  Metaphysics.  He  labored 
to  good  purpose,  and  in  1724  was  admitted  to  the  bar. 

But  admittance  to  the  -Bar  was  not  an  earnest  of 
success.  There  is  a dry  humor  in  Tytler’s  statement  (l)  that 
"in  the  first  years  of  Mr.  HomeTs  attendance  at  the  bar,  he 
found  abundant  leisure  to  store  his  mind  with  miscellaneous 
learning,  as  well  as  to  increase  his  knowledge  of  law."  It  v/as 
not  until  Home  had  brought  himself  into  some  prominence  by  the 
publication  of  a folio  volume  of  the  Benia r liable  Decisions  o f the 
Court  of  Session,  (1728),  "that"  — to  quote  again  from  Tytler 
(2)  --  "we  find  him  enjoying'  even  a moderate  share  o f practice 
as  a barrister."  The  reasons  assigned  for  this  initial  failure 
will  prove  of  interest  when  we  cone  to  consider  his  Elements  of 
Criticism.  They  will  be  spoken  of  in  that  connection. 

Success,  if  slow  in  coming,  did  finally  arrive. 

The  publication  in  1752  of  a volume  of  Assays  upon  law,  seems  to 
have  lifted  him  into  the  ranks  of  the  foremost  advocates  of  the 
time.  With  the  professional  prominence  thus  achieved,  came 


(1)  Memoirs . p 60. 

(2)  Memoi rs . p 65. 


. 


-16- 


social  recognition.  It  was  the  fashion  of  the  gay  young  men  of 
the  time  to  seek  out  and  attach  themselves  socially  to  those 
men  who  had  achieved  distinction  in  science  and  philosophy.  Such 
a circle  formed  around  Karnes.  (l)  Their  names  mean  little  to  the 
casual  reader  of  today,  yet  they  represent  the  fashionable  and 
literary  elite  of  the  time,  — the-  precursors  of  those  sturdier 
figures  which  were  to  he  associated  with  Karnes  in  the  latter  half 
of  his  life.  The  Select  Society  was  not  formed,  it  mil  he  re- 
membered, until  the  year  1754,  and  Karnes  was  a man  in  the  prime 
of  life  when  such  men  as  Blair,  Robertson,  and  Hume  were  but  be- 
ginning their  careers. 

Meanwhile,  he  met  Hume.  Tytler  gives  1757  as  the 
probable  date.  It  was  in  the  latter  half  of  this  year  that  • 

Hume  went  to  London  for  the  first  time  to  secure  the  publication 


(1)  Tytler  mentions  (pp.  84-85)  "Colonel  Forrester,  author  of  a 
valuable  little  tract  entitled,  -he  Polite  Philosopher . and  of 
whom  Dr.  Johnson  emphatically  said, 

*He  was  himself  -‘he  Great  Polite  he  drew! T 
Lord  Binning,  who  wrote  some  of  the  mo:  t tender  and  eloquent  of  the 
Scottish  songs;  Hamilton  of  Languor,  whose  poetical  merits  have 
deservedly  assigned  him  to  a place  among  the  British  Classics;  and 
the  Club  of  ..'its  who  frequented  Balfour 1 s Coffeehouse ,( the  : 
of  Will’s  or  Button’s)  in  the  early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century. 


-17- 


of  his  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  the  principal  doctrines  o:  wl  ich 
were  to  receive  further  elaboration  in  his  Philosophical  Essays. 
The  importance  of  the  accua intanceship  thus  eel,  and  of  Karnes’s 

subsequent  study  and  animadversion  upon  these  doctrines  of 
Hume’s,  cannot  be  overestimated  when  we-  come  to  our  consideration 
of  the  Elements  of  ^ritl cism . Por  it  was  upon  the  doctrines  which 
he  maintained  in  direct  opposition  to  Hume,  that  Karnes  based  not 
only  his  philosophy  of  life,  but  his  philosophy  of  literature 
and  literary  criticism.  The  two  chief  points  of  dispute  may  be  • 
stated  here. 


To  the  theory  of  Hume,  that  Utility  is  the  chief 
foundation  of  morals,  Karnes  objected.  He  contended  that  Hume  had 
fallen  into  that  error  common  to  most  philosophers:  the  error  of 

attempting  to  simplify  the  objects  of  their  research,  by  advanc- 
one  or  two  general  laws,  to  which  they  endeavor  to  reduce 
all  phenomena  of  our  moral  nature.  Karnes  insists  that  man  is 
a complicated  being,  motivated  by  innumerable  passions  and 
emotions,  and  influenced  not  by  any  one  of  them  alone,  but  by  all 
of  them  working  in  co-operation  or  in  restraint  of  each  other. 

The  many  springs  of  emotion  and  passion  thus  insisted  upon  here  in 
a professedly  moral  treatise,  we  shall  find  recurring  in  the 
Elements,  as  the  basis  not  alone  of  morals,  but  of  taste.  To  thus 


* 


-le- 


as signing  a common  origin  to  morals  and  taste,  Professor  Saints bury 
takes  great  exception  in  his  Hi  story  of  Cyiti cism.  It  is  not  my 
present  purpose  to  defend  either  of  the  two  great  views  as  to  ah  at 
shall  constitute  the  province  of  criticism.  It  is  here  noted, 
merely,  that  the  critical  theories  of  Karnes  are  founded  upon  those 
same  principles  from  which  arose  his  theory  of  morals;  of  this 
more  vail  be  said  3a  ter. 

The  second  great  point  of  dispute  between  Karnes 
and  Hume  was  the  doctrine  of  the  latter  which  questions  the 
reality  of  the  connection  between  cause  and  effect.  The  alarm  of 
Karnes  here  was  occasioned  by  the  fact  that  this  doctrine  tended 
to  invalidate  every  argument  to  be  dram  from  a study  of 
natural  religion,  for  the  existence  of  God.  He  attacked  it 
upon  these  grounds.  Admitting  that  the  connection  of  cause  and 
effect  CcJinot  be  demonstrated  by  reason,  he  insists,  nevertheless, 
that  we  are  assured  of  its  reality  by  an  inner  conviction,  an 
innate  principle,  whose  authority  is  final.  -he  insistence  of 
Karnes  upon  the  reality  of  certain  inborn  principles  of  man  iiich 
must  be  regarded  as  final  causes  for  his  thoughts  and  actions,  is 
here  proclaimed  in  the  service  of  moral  philosophy.  It  is  later  to 


-19- 


be  insisted  upon  with  no  less  vigor  in  the  Elements  , as  the 
ultimate  basis  of  taste  in  the  fine  arts. 

The  remainder  of  ICames's  life  will  be  sketched 
hurriedly.  He  was  married,  in  1741,  to  Miss  Agatha  Drummond  of 
Blair-Drummond . In  175  2 he  was  elevated  to  the  bench;  he  re- 
tained  his  seat  and  discharged  his  duties  up  until  a few  days 
before  his  death  in  1782.  The  formation  of  the  Select  Society 
in  1754  (1),  brought  him  into  closer  touch  with  those  men  of 
eminence  who  had  grownup  around  him  in  his  middle  life,  and  it 
is  tempting  to  linger  over  an  account  of  this  unusual  club  in 
which  were  assembled  the  wit  and  wisdom  of  the  old  Scottish 
capital.  Karnes  was  a charter  member  of  this  "insti tuti on,  intend- 
ed partly  for  philosophical  inquiry,  and  partly  for  the  improve- 
ment of  the  members  in  public  spesking,"  and  he  contributed  greatly 
to  those  "debates,  where  the  dignity  of  the  speakers  was  not 
lowered  by  the  intrigues  of  policy,  or  the  intemperance  of 
faction;  and  where  the  most  splendid  talents  that  have  ever 
adorned  this  country  were  roused  to  their  best  exertions,  by  the 
liberal  and  ennobling  discussions  of  literature  and  philosophy. "( 2 ) 

(1)  Hull  account  of  the  formation  of  this  society  is  given  in  a 
note  written  by  hr.  Alexander  carlyle,  and  preserved  by  hugald 
Stewart  as  the  first  of  the  ITotes  and  Illustrations  appended  to 
Stewart's  Life  of  Kobertson;  in  -L'he  collected  Works  of  lupald  Stewart 

TTSbhT  voI.lO,  ‘ 

(2)  Stewart's  Life  of  Robertson.  Collected  dorks,  10,  p 110. 


-20- 

But  this  must  pass  with  mere  mention;  as  must  likewise  the  famous 
Poker  Club  of  1762,  with  which  Karnes  was  heartily  in  sympathy,  but 
which  the  consideration  of  his  office  and  station  prevented  his 
joining. 

It  would  be  delightful  to  dwell  upon  his  association 
with  such  men  as  Blair,  for  whom  he  secured  appointment  as  lecturer 
on  Rhetoric  and  Belles-Lettres  at  the  University  of  Edinburgh; 

David  Hume,  with  vhom  he  remained  on  terms  of  intimacy  in  the  midst 
of  their  philosophic  bickerings;  our  own  Benjamin  lklin,  with 
whom  he  became  acquainted  in  the  autumn  of  1759  upon  the  occasion 
of  Eranklin’s  visit  to  Scotland,  and  with  whom  he  corresponded 
later  concerning  the  Elements  of  Grit  ici  sm.  17 or  i s it  amiss  to 
mention  his  friendship  for  his  own  printer,  Mr.  William  Smellie, 
to  whose  volunteered  criticism  of  the  Elements, he  made  grateful 
reply , and  with  whom  he  corresponded  from  time  to  time  on  terms 
of  mutual  esteem.  (l) 

: = bters,  however,  interesting  as  they  may  be, 
must  keep  us  no  longer  from  our  consideration  of  Karnes’s  critical 
work.  The  Elements  of  Criticism  appeared  in  1762.  It  purposes  to 
be  far  more  than  a work  upon  mere  rhetoric , or  even  upon  the  belles- 
lettres  , The  entire  province  of  the  fine  arts  is  to  be  examined 

(1)  V id e Lmoirs  of  the  Life  . ■•ri  tings . and  G o r r e s no nd e nc e o f 
William  EmeTTTe.  by  Robert  Kerr.  Edinburgh.  1611 . 2 vols . 1.  p.545 

if. 


-21- 


with  purpose  "to  trace  the  objects  that  are  naturally  agreeable, 
as  well  as  those  that  are  naturally  disagreeable;  and  by  these 
means  to  discover,  if  we  can,  what  are  the  genuine  principles  of 
the  fine  arts."  (1)  Truly  an  ambitious  undertaking,  and  one  in 

which  the  author,  in  spite  of  his  "omniscience”  and  his  usual 

* 

dogmatic  utterance,  seems  to  have  had  some  misgivings;  for  he  adds 
the  following  as  a note  to  his  Introduction: 

The  Elements  of  Gri ti c i sm , meaning  the  whole  , 
is  a title  too  assuming-  for  this  work.  A number  of  these 
principles  or  elements  are  here  unfolded:  but  as  the 
author  is  far  from  imagining  that  he  1ms  completed  the 
list,  a mo  re  humb le  title  is  p ro  pe  r , s ue  h a s may  e xpr  ess 
any  number  of  parts  less  than  the  whole.  This  he  thinks 
is  signified  by  the  title  he  lias  chosen,  vis.  Element s of 
Grit i ci sm. 

In  the  Elements  . as  Tytler  notes,  Karnes  is  entering 
upon  a field  of  research.  Other  authors,  from  Aristotle  down, 
had  made  some  attempt  to  list  those  passions  and.  emotions  to  which 
the  artist  might  profitably  appeal.  Karnes  purposes  to  go  farther. 
By  a study  of  manTs  nature,  he  hopes  to  arrive  at  those  basic 
principles  which  must  be  taken  as  the  ultimate  caus.es  for  his 
emotional  reactions.  In  other  words,  psychology  is  to  be  brought 
into  the  service  of  criticism.  Rhetoric,  if  understood  in  the 
Aristotelian  sense  of  the  art  of  public  ress,  we  shall  not  find. 
Karnes,  himself,  /as  not  eloquent  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word 


(1)  lements.  v 1,  p 6,  sixth  edition,  Edinburgh,  1785 


-22- 


v;as  used  by  the  rhetoricians  of  the  Universities.  We  have  hinted 
before  that  the  reasons  assigned  by  Tytler  for  his  initial  failure 
as  a barrister  would  have  special  importance  in  our  consideration 
of  his  theory  of  composition.  Ty^tler  says: 

His  first  appearance  may  have  given  evidence  of 
his  talents  as  an  ingenious  reasoner;  but  as  he  never  pos- 
sessed those  shining  powers  of  oratory  which  have  frequently 
raised  into  notice,  and  brought  into  high  employment,  young 
men  who  were  much  his  inferiors  in  solid  abilities,  it  was 
not  till  after  the  publication  of  his  first  work  on  law,  that 
we  find  him  enjoying  even  a moderate  share  of  practice  as  a 
barrister.  (1) 

It  is  hazardous  to  attempt  a guess  as  to  how  much 
influence  this  natural  inaptitude  for  public  address  may  have  had 
upon  Hames  in  determining  the  direction  which  his  studies  were  to 
take.  But  certain  it  is  that  these  studies  are  concerned  scarcely 
at  all  with  that  eloouence^  which  Professor  Millar  designates  as 
the  bane  of  eighteenth- century  Scotland.  (2)  IT  or  is  Zanies  pr  inari  - 


(1)  Memoir s . p 60.  v i. 

(2)  L Literary  History  of  Scotland,  p 321.  ,TIt  was  in  the  Scottish 
Universities,  however,  that  the^s^tdvin'g  after  eloquence  was  product- 
ive of  most  mischief.  The  word  i‘S~~always  cropping  up  in  the  de- 
scription of  enhnent  professors,  franc  is  Hutcheson,  when  enforcing 
the  moral  virtues  and  duties,  is  said  to  have  ’displayed  a "fervid 
and  persuasive  eloquence  which  was  irresistible.1  Dugald  Stewart 
tells  us  of  the  el  of  uence  with  which  Maclaurin,  the  famous  mathema- 
tician, ’knew  how  to  adorn  the  most  abstracted  subjects.’  The’ Strid- 
ing and  impressive  eloquence’ of  Dugald  Stewart  himself  'riveted  the 
attention  of  ^ven  the  most  volatile  student'  according  to  Scott, etc. T 
To  which  may  be  added  the  fact  that  in  the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric 

of  George  Campbell , which  we  shall  consider  in  another  chapter,  the 
term  e loquence  is  used  as  synonymous  with,  and  in  preference  to, 
the  term  rhetoric. 


■ 


-23 


ly  ooncerned  with  written  composition.  We  find  this  same  friendly 
critic  (Tytler)  complaining  that  Karnes  seemed  TTto  have  no  just 
conception  of  what  constitutes  the  chief  heauty  of  rhetorical 
composition:  a variety  in  the  structure  of  the  periods,  "both 
with  respect  to  their  length,  and  the  order  of  their  component 
parts,  so  as  to  excite  pleasure  by  the  contrast;  while  each  is 
so  framed,  as  separately  by  its  melody  to  satisfy  and  fill  the 
ear.”  (l) 

Karnes,  although  he  takes  due  notice  of  diction  and 
sentence  structure  in  a long  chapter  entitled  Beauty  of  Lan guage 
is  busied  for  the  most  part  with  cy.  ite  another  matter;  namely, 
that  (of  finding  by  a study  of  man1 2  s own  nature,  those  principles 
which  are  the  foundation  of  the  fine  arts,  and  then  insisting  that 
the  fine  arts  must  "hold  the  mirror  up  to  nature”  — or  forfeit 
their  title.  In  such  an  inquiry,  although  not  primarily  concerned 
with  mere  rhetoric,  Karnes  was  most  certainly  well  within  the 
classic  tradition.  Aristotle  had  pointed  the  way.  Cicero  had 
reiterated  that  the  orator  must  be  versed  in  all  knowledge,  and 
particularly  in  an  understanding  of  human  nature.  (2)  Thus,  if 

(1)  I.Iemoirs  . v IT.  p 214. 

(2)  Be  Or a tore.  (See  discussion  of  qualifications  of  orator  in 

Book  I.) 


- 24- 


clii  e fly  concerned  with  the  mere  business  of  appreciative  criticism 

Kames  nevertheless  went  to  the  root  of  all  criticism,  and  undertook 
a task  of  equal  interest  to  the  rhetorician  and  to  the  exponent 
of  belles-lettres . His  researches  were  vital  to  both  fields.  His 
findings  and  methods  proved  of  value  to  such  widely  differing 
v.rorks  as  Blair1  s Lectures  and  Campbell’s  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric. 

Ho  better  commentary  upon  Karnes’s  manner  can  be 
found  than  his  treatment  of  rhetorical  figures.  Hot  as  mere 
parts  of  the  mechanism  of  composition  are  they  of  interest  to  him, 
but  because  in  their  origin  anduse,  he  can  trace  the  workings-out 
of  certain  previously  discovered  principles  of  human  nature.  He 
says  : 

The  endless  variety  of  expressions  brought 
under  the  head  of  tropes  and  figures  by  ancient  critics 
and  grammarians , makes  it  evident  that  they  had  no  pre- 
cise criterion  for  distinguishing  tropes  and  figures  from 
plain  language.  It  was  accordingly  my  opinion  that  little 
could  be  made  of  them  in  the  way  o f rational  critic  ism : 
till,  discovering  by  a sort  of  accident,  that  many  of  them 
depend  on  pr inci pie  s formerly  explained.  I gladly  embrace  the 
opportunity  to_  sh ow  the  inf  luenc e of  these  principles  where  i t 
woul d least  be  expected . Confining  myself  therefore  to  such 
figures,  I am  luckily  freed  from  much  trash;  without  dropping, 
as  far  as  I remember,  any  trope  or  figure  that  merits  a 


-25- 


proper  name.  (1) 

So  essential  to  the  grounding  of  all  criticism,  did  Karnes’s 
contemporaries  consider  the  Elements,  that  both  Campbell  and 
Blair  clearly  acknowledge  their  debt  to,  their  master;  and  it  is 
almost  certain  that  neither  of  them  would  have  written  as  he  did 
had  it  not  been  for  the  work  of  one  who  was  neither  a rhetorician 
nor  exponent  of  poetics . in  the  strict  sense  of  the  words;  but  who 
more  than  either  Blair  or  Campbell  could  lay  just  claim  to  the 
title  of  Critic . 

Volume  I of  the  El ements  of  Criticism  is  composed  of 
seventeen  chapters;  for  purposes  of  analysis  it  might  well  be 
thrown  into  three  main  divisions.  Chapters  I and  II  will  stand 
for  the  first  two  of  these  three  major  parts;  they  are  Perceptions 
and  Ideas  in  a Train,  and  Passions  and  Emotions.  The  remainder  of 
Volume  I,  Chapters  III  — XVII  inclusive  goes  tO'  make  up  the  third 
division,  and  might  be  thrown  under  a general  heading  lifted  from 


(1)  Elements . v II,  p.  227  (the  underlining  is  my  own).  Apropos  of 
Karnes’s  treatment  of  the  figures.  Professor  Saintsbury  (History  of 
Criticism,  2 p.  468)  says:  --  "They  enjoy  a space  which,  without 

being  surprised  at  it,  one  grudges.”  The  inference  here,  if  the 
present  writer  can  judge  from  Professor  Saintsbury’ s context,  is 
that  since  it  was  the  fad  and  foible  of  the  age  to  main  much  of  the 
classi c-stock-in- trade  of  the  rhetorician,  we  must  not  oe  surprised 
if  we  find  Karnes  trailing  along  with  the  herd.  If  such  inference 
was  intended,  it  is  unjust  — and  w hat  is  more,  entirely  beside 
the  point.  Karnes’s  words  belie  this. 


r 


-26- 


the  text  itself;  An  Inquiry  into  ,Tsuch  attributes,  relations  ana 
circumstances . as  in  the  fine  arts  are  c hie fly  employed  to  raise 
agreeable  motions  . " (l)  It  should  be  added  that  although  Karnes 

here  and  elsewhere,  professes  to  establish  principles  upon  which 
to  base  a judgment  in  the  matter  of  the  fine  arts  as  a whole,  his 
attention  directs  itself  chiefly  towards  literature,  (2) 

It  is  an  article  of  faith  with  Karnes  that  to  attain 
respectability  as  a critic,  one  must  approach  an  understanding  of 
the  whole  nature  of  man.  We  may  find  faults  with  his  results;  his 
methods  may  seem  antiquated;  his  psychology  may  be  faulty;  but 
surely  in  spirit  and  intent,  his  work  could  scarcely  be  more 
relevant  to  the  business  of  criticism:  "to  trace  the  rules  of 

criticism  to  their  true  principles  in  the  constitution  of  the 


(1)  Elements  I,  p 195 

(2)  Professor  Saints bury,  in  Ins  History  of  Criticism,  has  laid 
it  down  that  "much"  of  Volume  I is  "irrelevant"  to  the  subject  of 
criticism,  and  offers  as  the  only  fitting  title  for  the  book, 
"Literary  Illustrations  of  Morals."  This  last  is  scarcely  fair.  It 
is  assuming  that  to  Karnes  morals  and  taste  were  synonymous  terms.  They 
were  not.  He  asserted  merely  that  the  one  was  as  capable  of  reasoned: 

analysis  as  the  other,  and  that  both  sprang  from  certain  fixed 
principles  of  human  nature.  If  these  principles  were,  as  he  stated, 
to  be  found  in  human  nature,  they  could  be  arrived  at  only  by  a 
minute  and  care  fill  analysis  of  human  nature.  A moralist  ay  study 
the  emotions  and  passions  of  mankind  to  determine  their  ethical  im- 
port. surely  a critic  of  letters  may  study  these  same  emotions  and 
passions  to  see  if  they  be  faithfully  and  naturally  delineated  in 
the  literature  which  he  must  criticise.  And  if  the  preliminary  ob- 
servations in  both  instances,  have  uch  in  common,  is  there  anything 
remarkable  or  "irrelevant"  in  the  fact?  It  is  human  nature  which  is 
analysed  in  both  instances.  Small  wonder  if  the  processes  duplicate 
each  other. 


-27- 

the  human  mind,  and  the  nature  of  the  passions  and  affections.”  (1) 

Chapter  I,  Percept  ions  and  Ideas  in  a drain, accompli sh- 
es  a brief  survey  of  the  characteristics  of  the  purely  intellectual 
functions  of  the  seat  of  consciousness.  The  theme  is  the  associatioi 
of  ideas;  the  inspiration  is  Locke.  It  is  pointed  out  that  vhile 
to  a certain  extent  our  chains  of  ideas  rnay  be  formed  involuntari- 
ly , yet  the  links  of  the  chain  are  logically  related  by  associa- 
tion; there  is,  moreover,  in  man  the  power  to  ive  closer  logical 
connection  to  his  thoughts  at  will;  that  this  power  is  based  upon 
our  perception  of  the  law  of  cause  and  effect,  and  upon  our  innate 
relish  for  order  and  connection.  This  latter  principle,  our  relish 
for  order  and  connection,  is  fundamental  to  all  the  enjoyments  of 
the  intellect,  whether  it  be  logic,  science,  or  literature.  Since 
it  is  thus  fundamental  to  all  intellectual  pleasure,  it  is  as  far 
as  we  can  go  with  our  analysis.  It  remains  only  to  test  the 
truth  of  the  principle  by  an  appeal  to  experience,  and  then  apply 
it  as  a standard  of  judgment  to  the  specimen  to  be  criticised. 

Karnes  makes  the  test  and  the  application  thus: 

(1)  Tytler , I,  p 378. 


' 


-28- 


The  principle  of  order  is  conspicuous  with 
respect  to  natural  operations;  for  it  always  directs  our 
ideas  in  the  order  of  nature;  thinking  upon  a tody  in 
motion,  we  follow  its  natural  course;  the  mind  falls  with 
a heavy  body,  descends  with  a river,  and  ascends  with  flame 
and  smoke;  in  tracing  out  a family,  we  incline  to  begin  at 
the  founder,  and.  descend  gradually  to  the  latest  posterity: 
on  the  contrary,  musing  on  a mighty  oak,  we  begin  at  the  trunk 
and  mount  from  it  to  the  branches:  as  to  historical  facts, 

we  love  to  proceed  in  the  order  of  time;  or,  which  comes  to 
the  same,  to  proceed  along  the  chains  of  cause  and  effect  y (1) 

How,  for  the  application  of  this  principle  to  criti- 
cism. He  says: 

Every  work  of  art  that  is  thus  conformable  to  the 
natural  course  of  our  ideas,  is  so  far  agreeable;  and.  every 
work  of  art  hat  reverses  that  course,  is  so  far  disagreeable. 
Hence,  it  is  required  in  every  such  work,  that,  like  an  organ- 
ic s stem,  its  parts  be  orderly  arranged  and  mutually  con- 
nected, bearing  each  of  them  a relation  to  the  whole,  some 
more  intimate,  some  less,  according  to  their  destination: 
when  d.ue  regard  is  lad  to  these  particulars,  we  have  a 
sense  of  just  composition,  and  so  far  are  pleased  with  the 
"composition.  (2) 

He  then  subjects  Homer,  Pindar,  and.  Horace,  to  the 
test  by  this  canon,  and  finds  that  in  spite  of  their  genius  they 
are  censurable  on  this  score;  as  likewise  are  Virgil  and  Sallust. 
Episodes  in  narrative  poems,  he  allows  a greater  latitude  than  he 
will  give  to  parts  of  exposition  or  argument;  but  he  insists  that 


(1)  Elements . v I,p25. 

( 2 ) Elements,  v I , p 27 . 


■ 


I 


-29- 


their  introduction  “be  graceful  and  natural.  He  instances  as  a 
violation  of  this  principle  the  descent  of  Aeneas  in  Hell,  which 
employs  the  sixth  hook  of  Aeneid. 

If  it  he  objected  that  all  this  is  wasting  a 
prodigious  amount  of  words  to  tell  us  what  we  already  know  and 
agree  to  perfectly;  namely,  that  a composition  should  he  coherent, 
I reply  that  such  is  not  at  all  the  case.  Karnes  is  giving  us 
a justification  for  our  love  of  coherence  in  composition;  namely, 
that  the  mind  demands  and  always  will  demand  coherence  in  any  in- 
tellectual process,  and  that  this  demand  is  based  upon  the  lav;  of 
order  and  association  of  ideas  which  governs  our  thought  pro- 
cesses. And  this  is  quite  a different  thing  from  the  charge 
brought  in  the  criticism  above. 

Chapter  II .Emotions  and  Passions . is  a long  and 
labored  attempt  to  analyze  the  character  of  our  emotional  pro- 
cesses. It  Is  this  chapter,  above  all  others  in  the  Elements . 
that  has  laid  Karnes  open  to  the  scoffers.  There  is  no  denying 
that  his  success  is  far  from  complete.  Strive  as  he  may,  labor- 
ing valiantly  through  his  Inductions,  he  cannot  make  a system 
rise  out  of  his  scattered  and  multitudinous  observations.  He 


himself  recognized  his  difficulties,  for  he  said: 


-3  0- 


Human  nature  is  a complicated  machine,  and  is 
unavoidably  so  to  answer  its  purposes.  The  public  indeed 
have  Ions-  been  entertained  by  many  systems  of  human  nature 
that  flatter  the  mind  by  their  simplicity:  according  to 

some  writers,  man  is  entirely  a selfish  being;  according 
to  others,  universal  benevolence  is  his  duty;  one  founds 
morality  upon  sympathy  solely;  and  one  upon  utility.  If 
any  one  of  these  systems  were  copied  from  human  nature, 
the  present  subject  might  soon  be  discussed.  Ait  the 
variety  of  nature  is  not  so  easily  reached:  end  for  con- 

futing such  Utopian  systems  without  the  fatigue  of  reason- 
ing, it  appears  the  best  method  to  take  a survey  of  human 
nature,  and  to  set  before  the  eye,  plainly  and  candidly, 
facts  as  they  exist,  (l) 

nevertheless,  he  makes  the  attempt  to  bring  some 
order  out  of  his  notes  and  observations.  The  terms  emotion  and 
passion  are  first  examined  to  see  if  they  be  synonymous,  and  he 
finds  that  they  are  distinguished  by  the  fact  that  passion  is 
emotion  plus  desire(2);  he  notes  the  causes  of  emotion  in  general; 
objects  of  sigbtand  sound  (3);  the  causes  of  the  emotions  of  joy 
and  sorrow  in  particular  (4);  the  fact  that  in  many  instances  one 
emotion  is  productive  of  another  (5);  and  so  on  and  so  forth  for 
some  one  hundred  and  forty  odd  pages.  As  has  been  said,  the 
system  refuses  to  erect  itself.  The  processes  of  induction  seem 
to  get  little  farther  than  the  gathering  of  material.  The  material, 
/hen  gathered,  appears  so  diverse  and  intractable  that  it  will  not 
combine.  Perhaps  he  succeeds  as  well  as  most  such  attempts  do. 


( 1 ) Elements  , 1 , p 34 . 

( 2l  Elements . 1,  p 41. 
(3/  Elements . 1.  p 52 

( 4 ) Eleme  nt s , 1 , p 57. 

(5)  Elements , 1,  p 66. 


' 


-31- 


At  least  lie  strikes  out  a great  many  single  instances  of  various 
shades  and  degrees  of  emotion,  and  hastens  in  each  instance  to 
illustrate  his  point  hy  references  to  passages  from  literature. 

It  is  this  constant  practice,  this  exemplification  of  his  observa- 
ins  by  reference  to  the  classics,  which  seem  to  have  suggested 
to  Professor  Saintsbury  his  title  of  "Literary  Illustrations  of 
Morals."  It  is  only  fair  to  note  in  this  connection  that  the 
device  is  as  truly  an  attempted  testing  of  the  worth  of  the 
literature,  as  it  is  an  illustration  of  Karnes's  contentions.  I1  he 
particular  canons  of  judgment  are  first  derived  from  Karnes's  own 
observation,  and  then,  and  only  then,  are  they  sought  for  in 
literature.  He  may  indeed  feel  some  satisfaction  in  finding  his 
points  corroborated  by  other  testimony,  but  he  is,  after  all, 
applying  the  truth  as  he  knows  it  to  literature  as  he  finds  it. 

And  that  is  my  understan  ing  of  the  business  of  criticism.  Observe 
the  following  example: 

Instinctive  anger  is  frequently  raised  by  bodily 
pain,  by  a stroke  for  example  upon  a tender  part,  which, 
ruffling  the  temper  and  unhinging  the  mind,  is  in  its  tone 
similar  to  anger:  and  when  a man  is  thus  disposed  before- 

hand to  anger,  he  is  not  nice  or  scrupulous  about  an  object; 
the  person  who  gave  the  stroke,  however  accidentally,  is  by 
an  inflammable  temper  held  a proper  object,  merely  for  hav- 
ing occasioned  pain.  It  is  still  more  remarkable  that  a 
stock  or  a stone  by  which  I am  hurt,  becomes  an  object  of 
my  resnntment:  I cm  violently  inclined  to  crush  it  to 

atoms,  d'he  passion  indeed  in  that  case  can  be  but  a single 
flash;  for  being  entirely  irrational,  it  must  vanish  with 
the  first  reflection.  ITor  is  that  irrational  effect  con- 


-52- 


fin  ed  to  bodily  pain;  internal  distress,  when  excessive, 
may  be  the  occasion  of  effects  equally  irrational;  per- 
turbation of  mind  occasioned  by  the  loss  of  a dear  friend, 
will,  in  a fiery  temper,  produce  momentary  sparks  of  anger 
against  that  very  friend,  however  innocent:  thus  Shakes- 

peare, in  the  Tempest, 

Alonzo  . . . Sit  down  and  rest. 

Ev’n  here  I will  put  off  my  hope,  and  keep  it 
ITo  longer  for  my  flatterer;  he  is  drown’d 
Whom  thus  we  stray  to  find,  and  the  sea,  mocks 
Our  frustrate  search  on  land.  Well,  let  him  go. 

Act  5,  Sc.  5. 

The  final  wo rds , JelJL,  let  him  go , are  an  expression 
of  impatience  and  anger  at  Ferdinand,  whose  absence  great- 
ly disturbed  his  father,  dreading  that  he  was  lost  in  the 
storm.  This  nice  operation  of  the  human  mind  is  by  Shakes- 
peare exhibited  upon  another  occasion,  and  finely  painted: 
etc.  (l) 


For  lack  of  space  this  one  example  of  Karnes’s  method 
must  suffice  here.  It  sufficiently  illustrates  the  point  that  he 
could  find  good  critical  use  for  his  observations  upon  the  nature  of 
passions  and  emotions. 

The  remainder  of  Volume  I,  that  part  which  might  be 
termed  Part  III  will  not  lend  itself  to  detailed  and  complete 
analysis  much  more  readily  than  did  the  discussion  of  Passion  and 
Emotions  . The  author  busies  himself  with  a study  of  sense  im- 
pressions, particularly  of  sight  and  hearing.  The  immediate  objects 
of  his  observations  are  "attributes,  relations,  and  circumstances” 
of  the  objects  of  consciousness.  These  attributes  etc . ar 


(1)  Elements , 1,  p 85. 


- 


■ 


’ 


-55- 


into  chapters  under  such  headings  as,  beauty . Grandeur  and  Sublimity 
l~o  velty , Resemblance  and  Piss  imilitude . etc.  The  typical  method  of 
investigation  is  as  follows:  Karnes  observes  that  beaut:; , for  ex- 

ample, invariably  gives  rise  to  emotions  characterized  by  " sweet- 
ness and  gaiety”;  that  is,  beauty  operating  alone  upon  the  mind, 
its  resultant  emotions  uninfluenced  by  the  operation  of  any  other 
considerations .( 1 ) Very  well,  then;  if  by  beauty  we  may  secure 
emotions  of  "sweetness  and  gaiety",  how  may  we  analyze  beauty?  Con- 
sideration tells  him  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  beauty;  intrinsic 
and  relat ive . 

Intrinsic  beauty  is  an  object  of  sense  merely;  to 
perceive  the  beauty  of  a spreading  oak,  or  of  a flowing 
river,  no  more  is  required  but  singly  an  act  of  vision. 

The  perception  of  relative  beauty  is  accompanied  by  an 
act  of  the  understanding  and  reflection;  for  of  a fine 
instrument  or  engine,  we  perceive  not  the  relative  beauty, 
until  we  be  made  acquainted  with  its  use  and  destination. 

In  a word  intrinsic  beauty  is  ultimate;  relative  beauty 
is  that  of  means  relating  to  some  good  end  or  purpose.  (£) 

How  although  he  has  just  called  intrinsic  beauty 
"ultimate"  he  goes  on  to  analyze  it.  A tree,  for  instance , may  be 
beautiful  in  sever  ' ways;  for  its  color,  shape,  size  and  motion. 
Each  of  these  beauties  is  susceptible  of  analysis  or  explanation. 

An  example  of  his  analysis  of  the  beauty  of  shape  or  figure  will 
suffice . 

A circle  and  a square  are  each  of  them  perfectly 
regular ^ being  equally  confined  to  a precise  form,  which 
admits  not  the  slightest  variation,  (thus  both  are  pleasing 
or  beautiful  and  their  beauty  may  be  traced  to  the 


(1)  Elements,  v 1.  n.  197 

(2)  Elements , 1.  p.  197 


-54 

inherent  love  of  the  mind  for  regularity  and  order, 
as  explained  above*  ) But,  "a  square  is  less  beautiful 
than  a circle.  And  the  reason  seems  to  be  that  the  at- 
tention is  divided  among  the  sides  and  angles  of  a square; 
whereas  the  circumference  of  a circle,  being  a single 
object,  makes  one  entire  impression.  And  thus  simplicity 
contributes  to  beauty;  which  may  be  illustrated  by 
another  example;  a square,  thoT  not  more  regular  than  a 
hexagon  or  octagon,  is  more  beautiful  than  either;  for 
what  other  reason,  but  that  a square  is  more  simple, 
the  attention  less  divided?  This  reasoning  will  appear 
the  more  conclusive  when  we  consider  any  regular  polygon 
of  very  many  sides;  for  of  this  figure  the  mind  can  never 
have  any  distinct  impression.  (l) 

So  much  for  the  method.  As  to  the  truth  and  value  of 


the  results,  opinions  may  differ.  Yet  the  present  writer  noted  not 
long  ago  --  he  cannot  reme  ber  where,  and  of  course  is  highly  cen- 
surable for  introducing  anonymous  testimony  into  a paper  of  this 
character  --  an  article  of  contemporary  art  criticism  in  which  these 
same  methods  were  employed  in  attempted  analysis  of  the  comparative 
beauty  of  straight  and  curved  lines.  Perhaps  no  one  ill  ever  be 
able  to  tell  us  why  beauty  is  beautiful;  perhaps  there  is  no  ans- 
wer. But  fames  attempts  it,  and  the  at  i t,  regardless  of  its 
success  or  ft  ilure,  seems  not  quite  ” irrelevant"  to  the  business 
of  criticism. 

Volume  II  of  the  Element s opens  with  a chapter  entitled 
Beauty  of  Language . The  chapter  is  a long  one;  one  hundred  and 
eighty- two  pages.  As  might  be  expected  from  a study  of  Volume  I, 
Karnes  is  not  interested  alone  in  giving  us  examples  of  beautiful 
language,  and  stating  the  rules  of  composition  which  may  enable  us 


(l)  fie meats . 1.  p.  108. 


to  imitate  it.  He  wants  to  go  farther.  He  wishes  to  ground  the 
rules  themselves  upon  human  nature;  and  by  this  time  we  have  seen 
enough  of  our-  author  to  know  that  by  human  nature  he  means  chiefly 
the  sensitive  powers  of  man.  examples  of  choice  literature,  he 
does  give  in  abundance,  and  for  the  most  part  quite  excellent  ones. 
Rules  he  does  lay  town;  and  they  are  not  copied  slavishly  from 
the  theories  of  the  time,  (l)  But  beyond  all  rules  and  examples 
lies  a reason.  This  reason  or  cause  is  the  goal  of  Karnes’s  study. 

The  root  idea  of  the  whole  chapter  is  that  expressed 
by  Karnes  in  his  discussion  of  beauty  in  "Volume  I,  above  cited; 

namely  that  there  is  intrinsic  and  a relative  beauty.  Relative 
beauty  is  exemplified  in  composition  when  the  separate  members,  bo  Hi 
large  and  snail,  are  well  adapted  to  the  immediate  end.  Mere 
perspicuity  is  a beauty  in  this  sense,  because  of  the  intellectual 
character  of  the  composition  as  distinguished  from  its  appeal  to 
sense.  But  quite  aside  from  this  relative  beauty,  this  adaptation 
of  means  to  an  end,  there  is  purely  a sensuous  beauty  of  language. 
Under  the  section  headed  Beauty  of  Language  with  respect  to  Bound 

(1)  His  opinion  concerning  rhyme  (and  by  rhyme  he  means  particular- 
ly the  heroic  couplet)  is  not  at  all  orthodox  for  his  times.  He 
ends  his  attack  upon  the  couplet  by  the  statement  that  "rhyme,  in 
Great  Britain,  will  in  time  be  forc'd  to  abandon  its  unjust  con- 
quests, and  to  confine  itself  within  its  proper  limits." 

(Elements,  2.  p.  176)  Which  limits,  he  who  cares  to  read  Karnes 
will  find,  are  a direct  challenge  to  the  school  of  Pope. 


- 


-26- 


Kames  begins:  "This  subject  requires  the  following  order.  The 

sounds  of  the  different  letters  come  first;  next  these  sounds  as 
united  in  syllables;  third  syllables  united  into  words;  fourth, 
words  united  in  periods;  and  in  the  last  place,  periods  united  in 
a discourse.  (1) 

I shall  not  follow  Karnes  in  his  discussion  of  these 
various  phases  of  composition.  He  is  for  the  most  part  just  and 
sensible.  The  point  to  be  made  is  this.  Karnes  grounds  his  scheme 
upon  direct  appeal  to  the  experience  of  sense.  He  would  teach 
composition  by  teaching  the  truths  of  what  is  agreeable  to  the 
ear.  How  many  classes  in  composition  today  ever  have  their  at- 
tention drawn  to  the  reasons  for  the  rules  which  they  are  com- 
pelled to  follow;  or  rather,  the  rules  which  are  offered  for 
their  guidance?  In  the  mere  matter  of  vowel  and  consonant  combina- 
tions, let  the  instructor  ash  his  class  to  distinguish  between  the 
effects  produced  by  the  first  and  last  stanzas  of  Poe's  poem.  The 
Bells . The  answers  he  will  get  should  be  illuminating. 

But  to  return  to  the  Elements : — a comparatively  short 
chapter  on  Comparisons . a much  longer  one  upon  figures,  and  five 
more  of  approximately  the  same  length,  Barra ti on  and  Description. 

Epic  and  Dramatic  Oompo sit ion.  The  Three  Unities.  Gardening  and 
Architecture . together  with  an  appendix.  Terms  Defined  and  Explained . 
complete  the  work.  Here  too,  Karnes  is  constantly  giving  rules  and 

(1)  Elements . 2.  p.  6. 


■ 


-57- 


examples  — unusually  distinguished  for  their  good  sense  and  propri- 
ety. Seldom  are  his  precepts  slavishly  adopted  from  the  school  of 
pseudo-classicism;  he  dares  deny  the  ordinances  of  the  gods, 
and  supports  his  denials  by  good  and  stout  reasons,  as  in  his 
attacks  upon  the  superstition  of  the  three  unities.  (1)  It  is  in 
exemplifying  the  reasons  behind  the  rules,  that  Karnes  takes  chief 
delight.  This  is  the  avowed  intent  and  purpose  of  his  whole  work, 
and  In  this  he  lays  claim  to  originality.  One  more  example  of  his 
methods  will  suffice.  As  noted  earlier  in  this  paper,  Karnes  spoke 
of  the  springs  of  human  action  as  being  extremely  numerous  and 
complex.  The  final  action  or  emotional  response,  he  asserted,  was 
the  result  of  many  tendencies  working  in  hanaony  or  in  opposition. 
This  final  example  illustrates  the  union  of  two  principles.  It 
occurs  in  the  chapter  entitled  Res emb lane e and  Kissimili tude  in 
Volume  I,  but  its  special  application  is  made  in  the  chapter  on 
Comparisons . Volume  II,  where,  indeed  it  is  cited  (2)  after  a con- 
sideration of  certain  phenomena  calculated  to  support  his  conten- 
tion inductively,  Karnes  says: 

Whatever  is  found  more  strange  or  beautiful  than 
was  expected,  is  judged  to  be  more  strange  or  beautiful  than 
in  re  lity?  Hence  a common  artifice,  to  depreciate  before- 
hand what  we  wish  to  make  a figure  in  the  opinions  of  others. 

The  comparisons  employ’d  by  poets  and  orators,  are 
of  the  kind  last  mentioned;  for  it  is  always  a known  object 

(1)  Elements  2,  p.  414.  "Modem  critics,  who  for  our  drama  pretend 
to  establish  rules  founded  on  the  practice  of  the  Greeks,  are  guilty 
of  an  egregious  blunder."  (Karnes) 

( 2 ) Kleme  nt  s . v I , p . 29  2 . 


, 


-38- 


that  is  to  be  magnified  and  lessened.  The  former  is  effected 
by  likening  it  to  some  grand  object,  or  by  contrasting  it 
with  one  of  the  opposite  character.  To  effectuate  the  lat- 
ter, the  method  must  be  reversed;  the  object  must  be  con- 
trasted with  something  superior  to  it,  or  likened  to  some- 
thing inferior.  The  whole  effect  is  produced  ux-)on  the 
principal  object,  which  by  that  means  is  elevated  above 
its  rank,  or  depressed  below  it. 

In  accounting  for  the  effect  that  any  unusual 
resemblance  or  dissimilitude  hath  upon  the  mind,  no  cause 
has  been  mentioned  but  surprise : and  to  prevent  confusion 

it  was  proper  to  discuss  that  cause  first.  But  surprise 
is  not  the  only  cause  of  the  effect  described;  another  con- 
curs, which  operates  perhaps  not  less  powerfully,  namely, 
a principle  in  human  nature  that  lies  still  in  obscurity, 
not  having  been  unfolded  by  any  writer,  tho1  its  effects 
are  extensive;  and  as  it  has  not  been  distinguished  by  a 
proper  name,  the  reader  must  be  satisfied  with  the  follow- 
ing description,  Every  man  who  studies  himself,  mm  t be 
sensible  of  a tendency  or  propensity  in  the  mind,  to 
complete  every  work  that  is  begun,  and  to  carry  things  to 
their  full  perfection.  There  is  little  opportunity  to 
display  that  propensity  on  natural  operations,  which  are 
seldom  left  imperfect;  but  in  the  operations  of  art,  it 
hath  great  scope  : it  impells  us  to  persevere  in  our  own 

work,  and  to  wish  for  the  completion  of  what  another  is 
doing’;  we  feel  a sensible  pleasure  when  the  work  is 
brought  to  perfection;  and  our  pain  is  no  less  sensible 
when  we  are  disappointed.  Hence  our  uneasiness  when  an 
interesting  story  is  broke  off  in  the  middle,  when  a 
piece  of  music  ends  without  a close,  or  when  a building  or 
garden  is  left  unfinished.  The  same  propensity  operates  in 
making  collections,  such  as  whole  works,  good  and  bad,  of 
any  author.  A certain  person  attempting  to  collect  prints 
of  all  the  capital  paintings,  succeeded  except  as  to  a few. 

La  Bruyers  remarks,  that  an  anxious  search  was  made  for 
these;  not  for  their  value,  but  to  complete  the  set. 

We  need  not  lose  time  to  describe  the  co-operation 
of  the  foregoing  propensity  with  surprise,  in  producing  the 
effect  that  follows  any  unusual  resemblance  or  dissimilitude. 
Surprise  first  operates,  and  carries  our  opinion  of  the 
resemblance  or  dissimilitude  beyond  truth.  The  propensity 
we  have  described  carries  us  still  farther;  for  it  forces 
upon  the  mind  a conviction  that  the  resemblance  or  dis- 
similitude is  complete.  We  need  no  better  illustration 
than  the  resemblance,  that  is  fancied  in  some  pebbles  to 
a tree  or  an  insect;  which  resemblance,  however  faint  in 
reality,  is  conceived  to  be  wonderfully  perfect. 


» 

• • 

* 


-S9~ 


So  much  for  the  concurrence  of  two  principles  in  the 
literary  artifice  of  cornua ris on.  Now  for  an  example  of  direct  ap- 
plication of  all  this  to  criticism?  I have  purposely  chosen  a 
faulty  application,  for  it  will  not  only  illustrate  the  method, 
hut  will  point  out  its  dangers  and  limitations;  it  may  moreover 
tend  to  corroborate  Tytler's  estimate  of  Karnes's  taste.  (1)  Most 
of  the  illustrations  in  Karnes's  text  are  not  open  to  this  fault, 
hut  occasionally  he  blunders  badly;  usually  from  a blind  atten- 
tion to  some  particular  "principle”,  and  a mechanical  application 
of  it.  Karnes  reaffirms  in  the  chapter  on  comparisons  that  "it 
hath  no  good  effect  to  compare  things  by  way  of  simile  that  are  of 
the  same  Kind;  nor  to  compare  by  contrast  things  of  different  kinds 
An  example  of  the  first  fault  is  given.  It  is  just.  Then  he  says: 

The  next  shall  be  of  things  contrasted  that  are  of 
different  kinds. 

Queen.  What,  is  my  Richard,  both  in  shape  and  mind 

Transformed  and  weak?  Hath  Bolingbroke  depos'd 
Thine  intellect?  Hath  he  been  in  thy  heart! 

The  lion  thrusteth  forth  his  paw 

And  wounds  the  earth,  if  nothing  else,  with  rage 

To  be  o'erpowered:  and  wilt  thou,  pupil-like. 

Take  thy  correction  mildly,  kiss  the  rod. 

And  fawn  on  rage  with  base  humility? 

(Richard  II,  Act.  v.  Sc.  I.) 

(1)  Tytler,  v 1,  p.  445.  He  asserts  "that  the  general  correctness 
of  the  author's  taste  was  more  the  result  of  study  and  attention, 
than  in  any  extraordinary  sensibility  in  the  structure  of  his  mind 
to  the  emotions  excited  by  the  production  of  the  fine  arts." 


-40- 


This  comparison  has  scarce  an y force:  a man 

and  a lion  are  of  different  species,  and  are  therefore  proper 
subjects  for  a simile;  but  there  is  no  such  resemblance  be- 
tween them  in  general,  as  to  produce  any  strong  effect  by  con- 
trasting particular  attributes  or  circumstances. 

What  is  wrong  here?  Surely  it  takes  but  little  of 
natural  taste  to  realize  that  while  the  comparison  may  not  be  of 
the  highest  order,  it  is  not  actually  censurable.  I think  we  can 
best  answer  Karnes  by  an  appeal  to  his  own  system.  He  admits  that 
a man  and  a lion  are  "proper  subjects  for  simile";  he  might  have 
added  "metaphor".  Intent  upon  his  first  canon,  that  dissimilar 
objects  afford  no  basis  for  contract . he  is  utterly  blind  to  the 
fact  that  in  the  passage  quoted,  a prince  and  a lion  have  been 
identified  by  the  boldest  of  all  devices,  an  implied  metaphor. 

By  this  implied  identification  the  two  are  placed  in  a situation 
where  the  queen  may  justly  reproach  the  "lion"  for  belying  his 
nature,  and  " fawning  with  base  humility."  Of  course  accidents  will 
happen;  but  it  is  highly  suggestive  that  this  man  who  can  tell 
us  exactly  why  a simile  or  metaphor  has  its  effect,  is  yet  not 
capable  of  appreciating  that  effect  in  a striking  example. 

I’he  fault  is  after  all  not  so  much  with  the  method  as 
with  the  man.  He  can  appreciate  the  effect  of  a given  figure,  be- 
cause his  intellect  tells  him  that  the  effect  should  follow.  But 
where  the  effect  of  one  figure,  as  in  the  instance  above,  depends 


; ' ■ 
t 


-41- 


up  on  appreciation  of  a preceding  figure,  he  copies  to  grief  unless 
he  has  noted  that  preceding  figure.  This  he  failed  to  do.  He  has 
missed  a link  in  the  chain,  and  will  come  out  in  error  with  math- 
ematical certainty.  Tytler  has  given  other  examples  of  this  fai  ling. 
(1) 

It  remains  only  for  us  to  take  notice  of  Karnes’s 
conclusions  u on  the  standard  of  taste  in  the  fine  arts.  It  is  much 
easier  to  point  out  his  failure  in  determining  this  standard,  than 
it  is  to  correct  his  error.  His  entire  work  has  led  us  to  believe 
that  within  each  of  us  are  those  final  and  ultimate  principles  which 
will  guide  our  judgment  infallibly.  Indeed,  we  might  all  expect  to 
arrive  at  the  same  standard  of  judgment,  and  all  set  up  for  critics 
in  our  own  right.  What  is  to  hinder?  Hoes  he  not  expressly  state 
that  "However  languid  and  cloudy  the  common  sense  of  mankind  may 
be  as  to  the  fine  arts,  it  is  notwithstanding  the  only  standard  in 
these  as  well  as  in  morals?” 

But,  alas,  he  no  sooner  says  this  than  he  begins  to 
qualify.  We  cannot  all  be  critics  all  at  once;  for,  "those  T«vho 
depend  for  food  on  bodily  labor,  are  totally  devoid  of  taste;  of 
such  taste  at  least  as  can  be  of  use  in  the  fine  arts.  This  con- 
sideration bars  the  greater  part  of  mankind;  and  of  the  remaining 
part,  many  by  a corrupted  taste  are  unqualified  for  voting."  The 

(1)  Memoirs . I.  p.  451.  55 


- 


■ ' jl 


♦ 


-42- 


exceptions  to  these  two  classes,  he  adds,  must  decide  matters.  In 
other  words,  falling  into  that  fallacy  knoim  to  logicians  as 
petitio  principii . he  says  in  effect:  "Those  only  have  good  taste 

who  — have  good  taste.”  The  standard  by  which  he  excludes  the 
greater  part  of  mankind  as  the  judges  of  taste,  is  his  own  pre- 
conceived idea  as  to  what  is  in  accordance  with  good  taste.  His 
taste  may  be  right;  but  if  it  be  formed  upon  those  unchangeable , 
fixed  principles  which  are  common  to  mankind,  why  are  not  all  other 
men  in  accord  with  him? 

I think  we  shall  have  to  agree  finally  that  Karnes 
has  chosen  his  title  wisely : -Elements  of  Criticism,  and  not  The 

Elements,  it  truly  must  be  called.  He  makes  a brave  attempt,  an 
original  attempt,  and  in  many  ways  an  extremely  valuable  attempt, 
to  sound  the  human  mind.  But  it  is  not  complete.  Certainly  some 
very  important  elements  escaped  him  in  his  main  treatment  of  the 
theme,  and  are  suggested  to  him  only  at  the  close  of  his  work.  He 
turns  from  them  hastily  as  though  too  tired  to  go  on  --  as  perhaps 
he  was.  If  he  had  not  made  a complete  system,  he  had  struck  out 
many  individual  canons  and  standards  which  served  well  as  measur- 
ing sticks  for  particular  passages  of  literature.  If  to  the 
spirit  and  inspiration  of  literature  as  a whole,  he  had  not  been  too 
attentive,  one  man  cannot  do  it  all.  Credit  is  due  him  that  he  did 
so  well  as  a critic,  with  so  little  natural  taste;  that  he 
escaped  so  well  from  the  idols  of  his  time,  with  so  little  chance 


. 


-43- 


of  escaping  them.  To  a boot,  English  was  almost  a foreign  tongue; 
English  literature,  a foreign  literature.  He  is  no  unworthy  critic 
who  can  master  an  unfamiliar  language  and  literature  so  thoroughly 
that  he  can  make  some  pretence  of  teaching  those  to  whom  it  is 
native . 

And  above  and  beyond  all  this,  he  has  the  greater 
claim  to  our  attention,  that  although  neither  an  exponent  of 
rhetoric  nor  a professor  of  belles  lettres  in  the  strictly  classic 
sense  of  both  words,  he  nevertheless  did  yeoman  service  in  both 
fields,  and  laid  down  a method  which  proved  of  equal,  value  to  those 
two  men  whose  work  I shall  consider  in  the  following  chapters. 


, 


■ 


. 


, 


BLAIR  AND  HIS  LECTURES. 


CHAPTER  III. 

Following  close  upon  ICames,  and  building  upon  the 
foundations  laid  by  him  in  the  Elements  of  Criticism,  comes  the 
Reverend  Dr.  Hugh  Blair  (l)  minister  of  the  High  Church,  and  Pro- 
fessor of  Rhetoric  and  Belles  lettres  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 
His  Lectures  first  appeared  in  their  present  form  in  1785,  but  por- 
tions of  them  had  been  read  to  classes  as  early  as  1759,  the  year 
which  began  his  connection  with  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  So 
well  were  these  Lectures  received  at  that  early  date,  that  in  1762 
a Chair  of  Rhetoric  and  Belles  Lettres  was  installed  and  endowed  by 
royal  decree.  This  chair  Blair  continued  to  hold  until  the  year 
1785. 

Unlike  Karnes,  Blair  laid  little  claim  to  omniscience. 

He  was  first  a divine,  and  second  a critic  of  letters.  A detailed 
study  of  his  life  adds  little  of  value  to  our  appreciation  of  his 
critical  worth.  Much  more  to  the  point  are  the  crisp,  vivid 
characterizations  given  of  him  in  "Jupiter”  Carlyle* s Autobiography. 
(2)  Contrasting  his  character  with  that  of  his  friend  and  fellow 

(1)  A Short  Account  of  the  Life  and  Character  of  Dr.  Hugh  Blair, 
by  James  Finlay  son,  I).  D.  in  Blair’s  Sermons.  London.  1801.  vol.'*5. 

(2)  P.  291.  ff. 


-45- 


minister,  Dr.  Robertson,  Carlyle  says: 

Dr.  Diair  was  a different  kind  of  man  from  Dr. 
Robertson,  and  his  character  is  very  justly  delineated  by 
Rinlayson  as  far  as  he  goes.  Robertson  was  most  sagacious, 
Blair  was  most  naif.  Neither  of  them  could  be  said  to  have 
either  wit  or  humour.  Of  the  latter,  Robertson  had  a small 
tincture  — Blair  had  hardly  a relish  for  it.  Robertson 
had  a bold  and  ambitious  mind,  and  a strong  desire  to  make 
himself  considerable;  Blair  was  timid  and  unambitious, 
and  withheld  himself  from  public  business  of  every  kind,  and 
seemed  to  have  no  wish  but  to  be  admired  as  a' preacher, 
particularly  by  the  ladies.  His  conversation  was  so  in- 
fantine that  many  people  thought  it  impossible,  at  first 
sight,  that  he  could  be  a man  of  sense  or  genius.  He 
was  as  eager  about  a new  paper  to  his  wife’s  drawing  room, 
or  his , own, new  wig , as  about  a new  tragedy  or  a new  epic 

__  _ _ _ 3^  >|C  ^ 

poem# 

Robertson  had  so  great  a desire  to  shine  himself, 
that  I hardly  ever  saw  him  patiently  bear  anybody  else's 
showing  off  but  Dr.  Johnson  and  Garrick.  Blair,  on  the 
contrary,  though  capable  of  the  moost  profound  conversation 
when  circumstances  led  to  it,  had  not  the  least  desire  to 
shine,  but  was  delighted  beyond  measure  to  show  other 
people  in  their  best  guise  to  his  friends.  TTDid  I not  show 
the  lion  well  today?”  used  he  to  say  after  the  exhibition 
of  a remarkable  stranger.  Ror  a vain  man  he  was  the 
least  envious  I ever  knew.  He  had  truly  a pure  mind, 
in  which  there  was  not  the  slightest  malignity;  for  though 
he  was  of  a ipuick  and  lively  temper,  and  apt  to  be  warm 
and  impatient  about  trifles,  his  wife,  who  was  a superi- 
or woman,  only  laughed,  and  his  friends  joined  with  her. 

I think  that  within  this  succint  characterization  of 
Blair,  the  student  of  his  Lectures  will  find  most  of  what  is  need- 
ful for  an  understanding  of  their  merits  and  defects.  To  the 
modesty  of  the  man  is  due  the  lack  of  that  dogmatic  utterance  and 
assurance  which  characterised  Karnes's  work;  to  the  impetuosity 

and  liveliness  of  his  disposition  — qualities  usually  at  variance 


, 


-46- 


with  sober  judgment  --  may  we  ascribe  his  championship  of  the 
claims  of  Ossian;  in  his  timidity  we  may  find  an  explanation  of 
that  curious  vacillation  between  his  own  instinctive  judgments  *- 
and  the  "rulesTt  of  pseudo-classicism:  a conflict  which  I hope 

to  make  apparent  in  this  chapter.  As  to  the  lack  of  humor  at- 
tributed to  him  by  Carlyle,  and  its  effects  upon  some  of  his  crit- 
ical judgments,  I have  some  personal  opinions  of  interest  to  my- 
self: but  as  they  are  far  from  orthodox,  and  would  ta he  time  and 

space  which  I can  ill  afford  for  their  justification,  I have 
judged  them  of  too  little  relative  importance  to  include  here. 

Various  judgments  have  been  passed  upon  the  value  of 
Blair’s  work  as  a critic  and  rhetorician.  Indeed,  the  same  author- 
ities have  at  different  times  contradicted  themselves  concerning 
him.  I offer  as  one  instance  of  this,  two  estimates  by  Professor 
Millar.  In  his  Literary  History  of  Scotland. . (1902)  , he  says: 

Into  the  enormities  perpetrated  in  the  pulpit 
it  is  needless  to  enter.  _ It  is  enough  to  refer  to 
the  egregious  sermons  of  Lr . Hugh  Blair,  which  in 
popularity  had  almost  no  competitor,  and  which  seem 
to  recapitulate  into  themselves  all  the  most  serious 
characteristic  faults  to  which  the  prose  writing  of 
the  eighteenth- century  had  become  liable.  (1) 

And  a little  later  in  the  same  volume  he  adds: 

The  author  whom  his  contemporaries  most  over- 
rated was  probably  Lr.  Hugh  Blair  ....  YYe  have  al- 
ready referred  to  his  Sermons  as  typical  of  the  worst 
sort  of  eighteenth- century  prose,  and  his  Lectures 
(1783)  on  his  professional  subject  are  not  much  better, 
though  they  have  some  value  as  an  indication  of  what 


(1)  pp.  ?19-£20 


-47- 


it  was  thought  proper  to  think  about  literature  at 
the  date  of  their  delivery.  Blair's  fault  is  that 
he  can  not  say  a plain  thing  in  a plain  way;  nor 
is  he  comparable  for  originality  and  suggestiveness 
of  view  to  Principal  George  Campbell,  of  Aberdeen 
(1719-96)  whose  Philo  soph}/  of  Rhe  t or  i c . though  some- 
what discursive,  is  by  far  the  most  valuable  contribu- 
tion to  criticism  which  came  from  Scotland  during  the 
Century.  (1) 

The  foregoing  are  pretty  flat  condemnations  of 
Blair’s  pretensions  to  any  worth.  But  in  his  volume  entitled 
Scottish  Pro se  of  the  seventeenth  and  Eighteenth  Centuries . ( 1912) 
Professor  Millar  seems  to  have  suffered  a change  of  heart.  He 
reiterates  his  remarks  about  the  general  worthlessness  of  the 
sermons,  though  in  far  less  vehement  manner  than  that  whieh 
characterized  his  earlier  utterances;  but  he  adds:  "His  Lectures 

appear  to  be  more  worthy  of  c onsideration. ,T  He  "owns"  --  the  word 
of  an  advocate  and  not  an  accuser  --  "that  they  do  not  open  too 
auspiciously,"  but  once  we  have  passed  the  beginning  sentences, 
he  asserts  that  we  "come  to  better  stuff;  something  much  more 
manly  and  bracing."  As  one  pursues  the  text,  his  wonder  grows 
as  to  just  how  far  Professor  Millar  had  passed  the  beginning  sen- 
tences in  his  work  of  1903;  at  the  end  we  come  to  this  complete 
about-face : 


Once  we  admit  that  it  (codification  of  criticism) 
is  a legitimate  operation,  we  shall  find  little  difficulty  in 


(1)  pp.  357-558 


-48- 


assigning  a high  place  among  its  practicioners 
to  Blair,  etc.  (1) 

As  to  the  ill-fated  Sermons  which  Professor  Millar  per- 
sists in  condemning  for  their  prose  style,  it  may  be  remarked  in 
passing  that  they  pleased  Dr.  Johnson  mightily.  This,  in  itself, 
is  no  surety  of  their  worth,  to  be  sure.  But  I do  not  think  that 
the  reader  of  today  will  find  them  as  bad  as  they  are  painted. 
Platitudinous  they  may  be.  In  sentiment  they  lend  themselves  to 
the  efforts  of  those  who  have  delighted  to  extract  choice  morsels 
from  moral  essays,  and  foist  them  upon  the  public  as  "Beauties". 

(a)  Yet  for  all  their  gentle  platitudes,  their  style  seems  scarce- 

y 

ly  to  merit  the  charge  of  egregiousness.  I have  found  much  more 
of  this  nature  to  condemn  in  the  Lectures  themselves;  — ■ though  not 
an  over  amount  there. 

I have  hinted  that  in  these  lectures  the  student  will 
find  a conflict  between  Blair's  own  natural  taste,  and  the  neo- 
classic standards  of  taste  to  which  he  feels  he  must  conform.  Be- 
fore going  on  to  the  Lectures . we  may  note  this  conflict  exemplified 
in  his  Dissertat ion  upon  Qssian.  Lever  did  man  come  to  more  grief 
than  did  the  good  Doctor  in  his  labors  to  justify  a "romantic" 
pleasure,  by  pseudo-classic  criticism.  It  was  not  the  epic 
structure  of  Ossian  that  entranced  him.  Of  this  we  have  ample 

(1)  Scottish  Prose.,  p*  224. 

(2)  I have  before  me  a curious  little  volume  entitled,  "The 
Beauties  of  Blair,"  Boston,  1828. 


-49- 


proof  in  those  beauties  upon  which  he  dwells  when  he  dees  not  feel 
that  he  is  defending  Ossian.  It  was  the  passages  of  "sublimity" 
that  thrilled  and  pleased  him;  the  gloom  and  obscurity  of  the 
pictures;  the  melancholy  of  the  emotions  called  forth.  But  accord 
ing  to  the  pseudo-classic  creed  of  "hind",  all  the  beauties  in  the 
world  will  not  save  a piece  if  it  be  not  true  to  the  "rules". 

Bo  Blair  justifies  Ossian  by  showing  how  he  conforms  to  the  rules. 

The  absurdity  of  all  this  was  mercilessly  pointed  out 
some  years  later  by  "Christopher  North"  (John  Wilson),  in  a re- 
view entitled  Have  You  Head  Ossian?  (1)  "Crusty,  rusty,  musty, 
fusty  Christopher,"  as  Tennyson  named  him,  was  a fine  tantrum  and 
laid  about  him  with  lusty  blows ; but  he  hit  the  mark.  Having 
amiably  designated  Blair  as  "the  simplest  of  all  professors  that 
ever  lectured  on  Rhetoric  and  3elle  s Lettres,"  he  laughs  the 
Dissertation  out  of  countenance,  as  indeed  it  deserved  to  be.  I 
quote  the  following  only  to  comment  upon  the  bare  possibility  that 
in  1903  Professor  III  liar  may  have  oeen  better  acquainted  with 
"Christopher  North"  than  with  Hugh  Blair.  Liston  to  Christopher; 

"What  if  all  this,  prodigious  nonsense  as  it  now 
appears  to  us,  be  true?  Hugh  Blair  is  a far  higher  name 
than  Christopher  North  — and  his  Sermons,  though  not 
proper  readings  for  Sundays,  are  not  to  be  sneezed  at, 
though  they  may  be  blamelessly  yawned  over;  but  his 
Lectures,  they  are  indeed  words  of  power  to  charm  the 
couch  of  the  wakeful,  ’tired  nature's  sweet  restorer, 
balmy  sleep.'" 


(1)  Blackwood' 3 Edinburgh  Magazine,  November,  1839 


- 


-50- 


After  reading  this  last  paragraph,  one  familiar  with  Christopher 1 s 
methods  and  disposition,  can  only  wonder  who  it  was  that  told  him 
that  "Hugh  Blair  is  a far  higher  name  than  Christopher  north." 

But  to  proceed  to  the  Lectures  . Professor  Millar,  as 
we  have  seen,  compares  them  with  the  work  of  Principal  Campbell  and 
pronounces  them  distinctly  inferior  in  "originality  and  suggestive- 
ness of  view,"  Comparisons  are  always  dangerous.  Particularly 
are  they  so  when  uttered  without  due  regard  as  to  whether  the  works 
are  fit  subjects  for  comparison.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  just 
comparative  estimate  can.  be  made  so  readily  in  the  case  of  two 
works  so  widely  different  in  aim  and  spirit  as  are  the  Lectures  and  a 
the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . The  first,  although  designated  as 
dealing  with  Rhetoric  and  Belle s Lettres.  concern  themselves  almost 
wholly  with  Bel  le  s Lettres;  or  rather  with  the  larger  division  of 
which  Belles  Lettres  is  a part.  I refer  to  the  ancient  classical 
designation  "Poetics".  Campbell,  on  the  other  hand,  concerns 
himself  with  Rhetoric  proper,  as  understood  by  the  Creeks  and 
Romans.  The  aims  and  interests  of  the  two  men  differ  almost  as 
much  as  do  the  problems  of  the  teacher  of  literature  and  the 
teacher  of  public  speaking  today.  Both  Blair  and  Campbell  are  in- 
debted to  Karnes  for  their  philosophic  and  psychological  grounding. 
This  they  have  in  common;  but  from  this  common  starting  point  they 


. 


. 


' 


-51- 

tread  diverging  paths.  So  far  as  I can  discover,  there  is  no  re- 
cognition of  this  fact  in  the  treatment  which  the  two  have  hereto- 
fore received. 

The  hectares  of  Blair  are  divided  into  five  parts, 
dealing  respectively  with  taste,  language,  style,  eloquence  (he 
lists  the  title  and  spends  a prodigious  amount  of  space  upon  it, 
but  scarcely  in  the  spirit  of  Campbell)  and  lastly  a critical 
examination  of  the  most  distinguished  species  of  composition  both 
in  prose  and  verse.  In  his  Introduction,  Blair  follows  hard  upon 
the  heels  of  Karnes  in  announcing  that  criticism  is  a rational  pro- 
cess, subject  to  the  dictates  of  reason. 

Sure,  (he  says)  it  is  equally  possible  to  apply  the 
principles  of  reason  and  good  sense  to  this  art,  as  to  any 
other  that  is  cultivated  among  men?  If  the  following 
Lectures  have  any  merit,  it  will  consist  in  an  endeavor  to 
substitute  the  application  of  these  principles  in  the 
place  of  artificial  and  scholastic  rhetoric;  in  an  endeav- 
or to  explode  false  ornament,  to  direct  attention  more  to- 
wards subject  than  show,  to  recommend  good  sense  as  the 
foundation  of  all  good  composition,  and  simplicity  as  es- 
sential to  all  true  ornament.  (1) 

He  then  proceeds  to  define  taste  In  art  as  "the  power 
of  receiving  pleasure  from  the  beauties  of  nature  and  of  art."  The 
ensuing  discussion  is  founded  upon  Karnes,  although  it  attempts  to  go 
beyond  and  correct  him.  31air  could  not  but  be  conscious  that 
Karnes  load  left  taste  somewhat  in  a muddle.  He  does  not  want  to  agree 

(1)  • Lectures . p.  10.  Sixth  American  Edition,  1871. 


' 


-52- 


\ 

with  Karnes1 s packed  jury  of  judges.  He  is  sure  with  Karnes  that 
taste  is  based  upon  principles  of  human  nature  (1);  that  its  bases 
are  the  ultimate  sense  likes  and  dislikes  (2);  with  Karnes  he  as- 
serts that  taste  may  be  improved  by  the  aid  of  reason  (3);  but 
like  Karnes  he  sees  that  not  all  men  are  equal  in  critical  discern- 
ment (4).  In  view  of  this  last  then,  what  shall  be  the  standard  of 
taste?  He  selves  the  difficulty  to  his  own  satisfaction  by  assert- 
ing that  time  will  solve  the  difficulty.  "To  the  ultimate  sense 
of  mankind  the  ultimate  appeal  must  ever  lie  in  all  works  of 
taste,"  is  a statement  that  must  be  qualified  by  the  added  as- 
surance that  in  spite  of  the  distractions  of  the  moment  and  the 
warping  influences  of  prejudice  and  ignorance,  "in  the  course  of 
time,  the  genuine  taste  of  human  nature  never  fails  to  disclose 

/ 

itself." 

Hqw  this  has  a specious  appearance  of  solving  the 
difficulty;  I very  much  doubt  if  it  does  more  than  appear  to  solve. 
How,  it  may  be  asked,  can  the  mere  passage  of  time  improve  the 
taste  of  the  vulgar?  It  is  by  a growth  of  reason,  in  the  individual 
that  he  experiences  a growth  of  taste.  The  vulgar  of  one  genera- 
tion are  not  the  elect  of  the  next.  They  die  off  and  are  re- 
placed by  new  vulgarians  whose  discrimination  in  matters  of  taste 

(1)  Lectures,  p.  16.  (2)  Ibid,  p.  17. 

(3)  ibid,  p.  19.  (d)  Ibid,  p.  17. 


-55- 


is  woefully  in  need  of  the  aid  of  reason  as  was  their  forebears'. 
The  intellectuals  of  one  generation,  those  whose  taste  is  admitted- 
ly discriminating,  may  indeed  be  freed  from  the  prejudices  which 
blinded  the  elect  of  a preceeding  age;  but  the  standard  of  taste 
is  still  in  the  keeping  of  the  cognoscenti.  The  vulgar  in  any 
generation  will  come  to  the  appreciation  of  genius,  I am  afraid, 
with  no  more  readiness  than  did  the  vulgar  of  that  generation  in 
which  the  genius  appeared.  The  man  of  the  streets  and  the  Loan  of 
the  soil  would  be  in  an  overwhelming  majority  in  any  census  of 
critical  opinions  of  today.  To  neither  would  the  literary  critic 
turn  for  a judgment  of  Homer. 

This  very  difficulty  with  his  own  solution  of  the 
question  seems  to  have  occurred  to  Blair,  although  he  does  not 
suffer  it  to  appear  in  company  with  his  theory.  He  allows  several 
hundred  pages  to  go  by  before  he  permits  the  troublesome  objection 
to  show  its  head.  Hear  him: 

It  i s vain  to  allege,  that  the  reputation  of  the 
ancient  poets  and  orators,  is  owing  to  authority,  to 
pedantry,  and  to  the  prejudices  of  education,  transmitted 
from  age  to  age.  These,  it  is  true,  are  the  authors  put 
into  our  hands  at  schools  and  colleges,  and  by  that 
means  we  have  an  early  prepossession  in  their  favour; 
but  how  came  they  to  gain  the  possession  of  schools  and 
colleges?  Plainly,  by  the  fame  which  these  authors 
had  among  their  own  contemporaries.  Por  the  Greek 
and  Latin  were  not  always  dead  languages.  There  was 
a time  when  Homer,  and  Virgil,  and  Horace,  were  viewed 


-54- 


in  the  same  light  as  we  now  view  Dryden,  Pope  and 
Addison.  It  is  not  to  the  commentators  and  univer- 
sities that  the  classics  are  indebted  for  their  fame! 

They  become  classics  and  school  boohs  in  consequence  of 
the  high  admiration  which  was  paid  them  by  the  best 
judges  in  their  own  country  and  nation.  (1).  (2). 

Alas  for  the  good  Doctor!  He  is  fighting  here  only 
the  battle  of  the  ancients  and  the  moderns  — but  with  such 
spirit  that  he  quite  fails  to  notice  the  blows  he  is  showering 
upon  his  earlier  statements  about  the  universal  taste  of  mankind. 

How  indeed  did  the  classics  get  into  the  colleges!  And  how,  we 
may  add,  did  Dryden,  Pope,  and  Addison  get  there?  The  Doctor  has 
told  us.  They  were  put  there  "in  consequence  of  the  high  admira- 
tion which  was  paid  them  b£  th  e_  -e!3~k  judges  in  their  own  country 
and  nation."  And  so  the  question  goes  bach  to  where  Karnes  left  it. 
Who  has  taste?  Why  --  "the  best  judges;"  or  they  — who  have 
taste!  Ho  one  who  reads  this  paper  will,  I venture  to  judge, 
disagree  with  Blair  in  his  contention  that  Horner  should  be  in  the 
college  curriculum.  The  point  is:  that  nine  tenths 


(1)  Lee tones  . p.  389. 

(2)  Vide  Durham,  p.  129;  John  Dennis,  speaking  concerning  Taste  in 
Poetry  gives  expression  to  this  same  view.  Says  he:  --  "He  who 
writes  for  the  few  today,  writes  for  the  many  of  tomorrow."  This, 
in  my  opinion,  is  utterly  false  in  so  far  as  it  means  that  the 
"best"  things  of  this  age  wi.  11  be  any  surer  of  recognition  by  the 
day-laborer  of  a century  hence,  or  any  number  of  centuries  hence, 
than  they  are  by  the  day-laborer  of  today. 


-55- 


ox  mankind  do  not  care  a twopence  that  he  is  there;  or  if  they  hatfe 
a care,  it  is  that  they  may  never  have  to  read  him* 

From  the  intricacies  and  subtleties  of  his  remarks 
upon  the  nature  of  taste  in  general,  -Blair  emerges  for  a space  to 
give  us  a sample  of  his  own  taste.  It  is  here  that  v/e  note  again 
the  perplexity  of  the  Professor,  torn  between  his  own  judgment  and 
the  "rules’',  His  timidity  makes  him  compromise.  The  subject  of 
his  criticism  is  Bhakespeare: 

Shakespeare  pleases,  not  by  his  bringing  the 
transactions  of  many  years  into  one  play;  not  by  his 
grotesque  mixture  of  tragedy  and  comedy  in  one  piece, 
nor  by  the  strained  thoughts  and  affected  witticisms, 
which  he  sometimes  employe.  These  we  consider  as  blem- 
ishes, and  impute  them  to  the  grossness  of  the  age  in 
which  he  lived.  But  he  pleases  by  his  animated  and 
masterly  representation  of  characters,  by  the  liveliness 
of  his  descriptions,  the  force  of  his  sentiments,  and  his 
possessing,  beyond  all  writers,  the  natural  language  of 
passion;  beauties  which  criticism  no  less  teaches  us  to 
place  in  the  highest  rank, than  nature  teaches  us  to  feel.(l) 

With  what  relief  he  is  able  in  that  last  sentence  to  justify 

"nature”  by  "criticism” I 

Let  us  not  be  too  harsh  upon  Blair  for  this  pandering 
to  the  rules.  It  cannot  be  recalled  too  often  that  he  was  a Boot, 
and  that  the  literature  he  criticised  was  English.  Hr.  Johnson 

was  down  at  London,  and  unless  one  remembered  that  Samuel  had  turn- 
ed and  rent  his  own  litter  in  that  memorable  preface  which  exploded 
the  three  unities,  — unless  one  happened  to  remember  this,  I say, 

(1)  Lectures,  p.  29. 

II  II — — g— WWW — — — 


. 


-56 


lie  might  scarcely  suspect  Samuel  of  having  done  it.  On  the  whole, 
it  must  have  seemed  reasonable  that  the  English  should  know  the 
genius  of  their  own  language  and  literature.  End  Scotland  was 
desperately  trying  to  be  English,  There  is  some  excuse  for  Blair 
if  he  rather  helplessly  submits  to  rules  which  torture  his  ingen- 
uity to  justify  his  own  taste.  It  is  a point  in  his  favor  that 
he  somehow  or  other  got  his  admiration  for  Shakespeare  recorded. 

Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  one  turns  back  with  relish  to  Karnes, 
who  threw  the  whole  matter  of  the  unities  unceremoniously  into 
the  dust -bin. 

following  hard  upon  this  criticism  of  Shakespeare, 
Blair  treats  us  to  an  analysis  of  Sublimity  in  KamesTs  best  manner. 
Sublimity,  he  tells  us,  has  a tvo-fold  aspect  for  the  subject  of 
criticism:  Sublimity  in  Objects . and  Sublimity  in  Writing.  Of 

the  former,  he  lists  the  elements.  l*hey  are  vastness,  great  power 
and  strength,  terror,  obscurity,  darkness,  disorder,  magnanimity, 
and  heroism.  After  some  further  observations  he  arrives  at  the 
conclusion  that  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  objective  sublimity  seems 
to  be  "mighty  force  or  power,  whether  accompanied  by  terror  or 
not . " ( 1 ) 


(1)  Lectures,  p.  57 


* 


-57- 


Thence  he  passes  to  the  sublime  in  writing.  Here  he 
warns  us  to  be  on  our  guard  against  the  false  sublime,  or  "sublime 
style."  This  he  pronounces  "for  the  most  part  a very  bad  style." 
But,  "wherever  a great  and  awful  object  is  presented  in  nature,  or 
a very  magnanimous  and  exalted  affection  of  the  human  mind  is  dis- 
played; thence  if  you  can  catch  the  impression  strongly,  and 
exhibit  it  warm  and  glowing,  you  may  draw  the  sublime.”  As  an  in- 
stance of  the  true  sublime  he  gives  us:  MG-od  said,  let  there  be 

light,  and  there  was  light."  As  an  instance  of  the  false  sublime 
style  he  quotes:  "The  soverign  arbitrer  of  nature,  by  the 

potent  energy  of  a si  ngle  word,  commanded  the  light  to  exist." 

Very  good.  Would  that  diair  could  always  follow  his 
own  precepts.1  Professor  Millar  has  accused  -Blair  of  writing  ex- 
ecrable prose.  He  gives  the  following  example,  which,  although  not 
typical  of  Blair's  style  by  any  means,  is  reduplicated  far  too  often 
particularly  in  the  Lectures.  When  Blair  wishes  to  say  that  a good 
writer  may  be  a bad  man,  he  puts  it  thus:  "Elegant  speculations  are 
sometimes  found  to  float  upon  the  surface  of  the  mind,  vhile  bad 
passions  possess  the  interior  of  the  heart."  (l)  It  is  extremely 
difficult  to  see  how  a man  who  could  criticise  the  one  instance  of 
the  false  sublime  quoted  above,  could  be  guilty  of  the  other. 

(1)  Literary  History  of  Scotland,  p.  558.  v.  1. 


-58- 


There  follows  this  discussion  of  the  sublime  in  Blair, 
mother  typical  Kamesian  discussion  of  Beauty.  The  chapter  affords 
but  one  passage  of  interest  to  us,  and  that  of  an  incidental  nature. 
I refer  to  Blair’s  remarks  upon  gardening,  which  show  that  he  was 
not  thoroughly  imbued  with  eighteenth- century  English  ideas. 
Witness  his  remarks: 

A straight  canal  is  an  insipid  figure,  in 
comparison  with  the  meanders  of  rivers.  Cones  and 
pyramids  are  beautiful;  but  trees  growing  in  their 
natural  wildness,  are  infinitely  more  beautiful  than 
when  trimmed  into  pyramids  and  cones.  The  apartments 
of  a house  must  be  regular  in  their  disposition,  for 
the  conveniency  of  its  inhabitants;  but  a garden 
which  is  designed  merely  for  beauty,  would  be  ex- 
ceedingly disgusting,  if  it  had  as  much  uniformity 
and  order  in  its  parts  as  a dwelling  house.  (1) 

Next  Blair  enters  upon  a subject  dear  to  the  eight- 
eenth century  heart:  a history  of  the  rise  and  progress  of 

language  from  Adam  to  the  eighteenth  century.  There  is  little  to 
claim  our  attention  till  we  come  to  the  tenth  lecture,  a treatment 
of  style.  Here  Blair  wrestles  with  the  problem  of  defining  style. 

He  recognizes  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  separate  it  from 
substance,  yet  he  tries  it.  Insofar  as  it  may  be  treated  separate- 
ly, its  qualities  "may  be  ranged  under  two  heads,  perspicuity  and 
ornament."  Perspicuity  is  absolutely  essential,  and  must  be 


(1)  Lectures . p.  51 


' 


-59- 


secured  by  attention  both  to  single  words  and  to  their  union  into 
sentences.  He  will  have  it  that  there  are  no  true  synonyms,  and 
his  insistence  upon  the  right  word  in  the  right  place  is  suggest- 
ive of  the  care  that  Ruskin  was  to  recommend;  though  perhaps 
Ruskin  was  more  concerned  v/ith  the  connotative  value  of  a word, 
than  with  its  mere  accuracy. 

As  to  the  structure  of  sentences,  he  will  have  us 
give  regard  to  clearness  and  precision;  unity;  strength;  and 
harmony.  To  secure  strength  in  a sentence,  we  are  instructed  to 
"prune  it  of  all  redundant  words”  and  to  "contract  the  round- 
about expression.  Here  a severe  eye  should  be  employed;  and  we 
shall  always  find  our  sentences  acquire  more  vigor  and  energy 
when  thus  retrenched:  provided  always  that  we  do  not  run  into 

the  extreme  of  pruning  so  very  close  , as  to  give  a hardness  and 
dryness  to  the  style.  Hor  here,  as  in  all  other  things,  there  is  a 
due  medium.  Some  regard,  though  not  the  principal,  must  be  had  to 
fulness  and  swelling  of  sound.  Some  leaves  must  be  left  to  sur- 
round and  shelter  the  fruit."  (l) 


(1)  Lectures . p.  125 

It  must  be  under  this  last  proviso  that  Blair  wrote  that  sent- 
ence concerning  "elegant  speculations".  Or  the  following  sentence: 
"The  expressions  which  come  warm  and  glowing  from  the  mind,  during 
the  fervour  of  pronunciation,  will  often  have  a superior  grace  or 
energy  to  those  which  are  studied  in  the  retirement  of  the  closet." 
Or:  "Infinitely  better  it  is,  to  venture  into  the  pulpit  v/ith 
thoughts  arid  expressions  which  have  occurred  to  themselves,  though 
of  inferior  beauty,  than  to  disfigure  their  compositions  by  borrow- 
ed and  ill-sorted  ornaments,  which  to  the  judicious  eye,  vail  al- 
ways be  in  hazard  of  discovering  their  own  poverty. " ? L e c tur e s . 
p.  521;  and  p.  525.) 


-60- 


Blair,  here,  is  engaged  with  co nr.  osition.  which  is 
certainly  disputed  ground  between  rhetoric  and  poetics . being  ob- 
viously indispensable  to  both,  Uor  con  we  lay  it  down  with  certain- 
ty, as  in  some  instances  is  possible,  which  of  these  two  departments 
is  more  emphasized  in  his  treatment.  Her  when  he  comes,  after 
some  further  comments  upon  style,  to  a detailed  examination  of 
chosen  specimens  of  composition,  can  we  pronounce  with  any  more 
certainty  whether  his  observations  are  more  pertinent  to  the 
useful  art  or  the  fine  art.  He  condemns  Shaft  sbury*s  extreme 
artificiality;  praises  Addison's  prose  style  highly,  and  subjects 
four  of  his  Spectator  Papers  to  ’'sound,  if  somewhat  meticulous"  (1) 
examination;  style  is  discussed  as  being  diffuse  or  concise, 
feeble  or  nervous,  dry,  plain,  neat,  elegant,  and  flowery;  and 
then  he  plunges  into  his  treatment  of  eloquence  and  does  not  eusxge 
short  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-six  pages. 

Such  an  amount  of  space,  ostensibly  devoted  to  the 
needs  of  the  orator  and  evidently  intended  to  meet  in  some  sort 
the  desires  of  his  classes  in  "eloquence",  would  at  first  seem 
inconsistent  with  the  statement  that  ^lair  is  not  directly  cons  ern- 
ed  with  rhetor ic . But  even  a cursory  study  of  the  nine  lectures 
mailing  up  this  division  will  show  that  Blair  advances  very  little 

(1)  The  words  are  Professor  Baintsbury's.  History  of  Criticism. 

2.  p.  463. 


! 


! * - ‘ 


; 


« 


- Gl- 


int o the  field.  (His  treatment  of  Elocution  is  primarily  concerned 
with  the  matter  of  diction,  and  his  various  ie  ctures  upon  oratory 
do  little  more  than  repeat  his  previously  uttered  injunctions  as 
to  perspicuity,  fluency,  and  elegance  of  style ^ The  classic 
element  of  invent io . or  gathering  and  arranging  of  material,  which 
occupies  such  great  place  in  the  traditional  rhetorical  training; 
the  insistence  that  the  orator  shall  occupy  the  whole  province  of 
knowledge,  which  Cicero  expounds  (1);  all  this  is  scarcely  touched 
upon  by  Blair.  It  is  further  noteworthy  — though  in  this  he  is 
more  pertinent  to  the  subject  than  was  Aristotle  — that  but  one 
lecture  out  of  the  nine  is  devoted  to  dlivery.  Of  that  lecture 
the  less  said  the  better.  (2) 

Emerging  from  his  treatment  of  oratory  (which,  then, 
was  less  a consideration  of  oratory  than  a reapplication  of  his 


(1)  he  Oratore,  Book  I. 

(2)  The  Story  of  The  University  of  Edinburgh,  oir  Alexander  Grant 
( 1884]  v.  II.  p.  S57:  —^Admired  as  Blair  was  as  a preacher,  his 
sermons  were  better  in  print  than  when  delivered  by  him;  for  he 
had  no  graces  of  delivery,  and  ’independently  of  a very  strong 
provincial  accent,  his  elocution  was  but  indifferent  from  a defect 
in  the  organ  of  pronunciation.'  He  appears  to  have  been  singularly 
deficient  as  an  extempore  speaker , and  on  this  account  declined  to 
be  made  Moderator  of  the  General  Assembly,  hr.  Carlyle  smiles  at 
the  idea  of  someone  having  written  to  ask  Blair  to  instruct  him  in 
the  art  of  preaching." 


-62- 


remarks  upon  diction  and  style)  31air  is  happy  to  return  to  avowed 
matters  of  literary  criticism;  but,  alas,  he  lias  largely  spent 
himself,  end  has  little  new  material  — certainly  little  material 
of  value  — to  give  us.  In  rules  of  composition  he  was  often 
happy;  usually  just.  He  now  discusses  in  the  following  order: 

Comparative  Merit  of  the  Ancients  and  the 
Moderns:  Historical  Writing:  Philosophical  Writing  -- 

Dialogue,  Epistolary  'Writing,  Fictitious  History; 

Uature  of  Poetry,  Its  Origin  and  Progress,  Versifica- 
tion; Pastoral  Poetry,  Lyric  Poetry:  Didactic  Poetry, 

Descriptive  Poetry;  The  Poetry  of  the  Hebrews:  Epic 

Poetry,  Homer,  Virgil,  Voltaire,  and  Milton:  Dramatic 

Poetry,  Tragedy,  Greek  Tragedy,  French  Tragedy:  Comedy 

--  Greek,  Homan,  French  and  English. 

Here  indeed  is  a wealth  of  title;  but  observe  the  character  of  the 

titles;  — they  are  ’’kinds” . Blair  promises  that  in  his  discussion 

of  these  subjects  he  will  "freely  deliver  {his)  opinion:  regarding 

authority  no  farther,  than  it  appears  to  (him)  founded  on  good 

sense  and  reason."  There  is  something  ominous  in  these  last  words-- 

"good  sense  and  reason."  One  gets  a sudden  foreboding  that  B]air 

may  confuse  his  own  good  sense  and  reason  with  that  of  the  English 

Augustans.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  he  does  so. 

It  is  rather  a dreary  journey  to  the  end  of  the 
volume.  We  know  what  to  expect,  for  example,  when  Blair  enters 
upon  his  discussion  of  the  origin  and  progress  of  poetry.  He 
had  said  it  all  before  in  his  history  of  the  rise  and  progress  of 

language.  In  his  discussion  of  the  heroic  couplet  he  shows  us  how 


■ 


65- 


uninspired  he  can  really  he.  Says  he: 

The  present  form  of  our  English  heroic  rhyme 
in  couplets  is  a modem  species  of  versification  -- 
Waller  was  the  first  who  brought  couplets  into  vogue; 
and  Dryden  afterwards  established  the  usage.  Waller, 
first  smoothed  our  verse;  Dryden  perfected  it.  Mr. 

Pope’s  versification  has  a peculiar  character.  It  is 
flowing  and  smooth  in  the  highest  degree:  far  more 

laboured  and  correct  than  that  of  any  who  went  before 
him.  He  introduced  one  considerable  change  into  her- 
oic verse,  by  totally  throwing  aside  the  triplets,  or 
three  lines  rhyming  together,  in  which  Mr.  Dryden 
abounded.  Dryden ’s  versification,  however,  has  very 
great  merit;  and  like  all  his  productions,  has  much 
spirit  mixed  with  carelessness.  If  not  so  smooth  and 
correct  as  Pope’s,  it  is  however  more  varied  and  easy. 

He  subjects  himself  less  to  the  rule  of  closing  the 
sense  with  the  couplet;  and  frequently  takes  the  liberty 
of  making  his  couplets  run  into  one  another,  with  some- 
what the  freedom  of  blank  verse.  (1) 

How  all  this  may  be  very  true,  tho  gh  as  to  its  being 
Waller  who  "first  smoothed  our  verse,"  — there  be  those  who  doubt. 
But  if  it  is  all  true,  what  of  it  I Vie  want  to  know  what  Dr.  Blair 
would  have  to  say  anent  the  liberties  which  Dryden  took  with  the 
"rules".  Does  Dr.  Dp  sir  approve  of  Pope’s  having'  ’’thrown,  aside  the 
triplets,  in  vhich  Mr.  Dryden  abounded?"  It  is  by  answers  to  these 
questions  that  Dr.  Blair  should  reveal  himself  fully.  But  Dr.  Blair 
is  silent.  He  says  that  Pope  achieved  a maximum  of  correctness  in 
his  verse.  Does  he  mean  to  imply  disapproval  of  Mr.  Dryden  for  not 


(1)  Lectures,  p.  455. 


-64- 


having  done  the  same?  I am  afraid  he  does.  The  admission  that 
"Mr.  Drydenfs  verse,  however,  has  great  merit,"  bears  suspicious 
resemblance  to  diair's  "blemish- saved-by-beauty"  criticism  of 
Shakespeare. 

A genuine  and  almost- just  tribute  to  Milton  in  the 
discussion  of  Lpio  Poetry  (1)  revives  our  hopes  for  a time,  ani 
when  in  the  discussion  of  Tragedy  we  arrive  at  the  following,  we 
take  decided  heart.  I give  this  long  quotation  in  full  to  show 
how  he  build,  s up  our  hope  for  him,  along  with  his  own  mounting 
courage . 

"All  that  I have  hitherto  said,  relates  to 
the  unity  of  dramatic  action?  In  order  to  render  the 
unity  of  action  more  complete,  critics  have  added  the 
other  two  unities  of  time  and  place.  The  strict  ob- 
servance of  these  is  more  difficult,  and,  perhaps,  not 
so  necessary.  The  unity  of  place  requires  that  the 
scene  slhould  never  be  shifted;  but  that  the  action  of 
the  play  should  be  continued  to  the  end  in  the  same 
place  where  it  is  supposed  to  begin.  The  unity  of  time, 
strictly  taken,  requires  that  the  time  of  action  be  no 
longer  than  the  time  that  is  allowed  for  the  representa- 
tion of  the  play;  though  Aristotle  seems  to  have  given 
the  poet  a little  more  liberty,  and  permitted  the  action 
to  comprehend  the  thole  time  of  one  day. 

"The  intention  of  both  these  rules  is,  to  over- 
charge as  little  as  possible,  the  imagination  of  the 
spectators  with  improbable  circumstances  in  the  acting 
01  the  play,  and  to  bring  the  imitation  more  close  to 
reality.  Vie  must  observe  that  the  nature  of  dramatic 
exhibitions  upon  the  Greek  stage  subjected  the  aa  ci  ent 
tragedians  to  a more  strict  observance  of  those  unities 
than  is  necessary  in  modern  theatres.  I showed  that  Greek 


(1)  Lectures . pp.  505-506 


. 


t 


■ 


-65- 


tragedy  was  one  uninterrupted  representation  from 
beginning  to  end.  There  was  no  division  of  acts; 
no  pauses  or  intervals  between  them;  but  the  stage 
was  continually  full,  occupied  either  by  the  actors 
or  the  chorus.  Hence  no  room  was  left  for  the 
imagination  to  go  beyond  the  precise  time  and  place 
of  the  representation;  any  more  than  is  allowed  dur- 
ing the  continuance  of  one  act  on  the  modern  theatre. 

"But  the  practice  of  suspending  the  spectacle 
totally  for  some  little  time  between  the  acts,  has 
made  a great  and  material  change;  it  gives  more  lat- 
itude to  he  imagination,  and  renders  the  aicient 
strict  confinement  to  time  and  place  less  necessary. 

While  the  acting  of  the  play  is  interrupted,  the  spectator 
can,  wi  thout  any  great  or  violent  effort,  suppose  a few 
hours  to  pass  between  every  act;  or  can  suppose  himself 
moved  from  one  apartment  of  a palace  to  another;  and 
therefore,  too  strict  an  observance  of  these  unities, 
ought  not  be  preferred  to  higher  beauties  of  execution, 
nor  to  the  introduction  of  more  pathetic  situations, 
which  sometimes  cannot  be  accomplished  in  any  other  way, 
than  by  a transgression  of  these  rules."  (1) 

At  length  Blair  has  led  us  by  a gradual  ascent  to 

the  position  attained  by  Karnes  in  a single  bound.  But  now  observe 

how  he  lias  lifted  us  up  only  to  dash  us  down.  The  unhappy  man 

can  not  escape  "the  rules."  (l)  They  plague  and  haunt  him; 

(1)  Professor  Willard  Higley  Durham,  editor  of  Critical  Assays  o f 
the  eighteenth  century . takes  occasion  to  remonstrate  against  the 
tendency  to  pigeon-hole  the  eighteenth  century  as  the  age  of  "rules' 
He  says  (p.  XI)"For  the  really  thoroughgoing  classicist  or  ration- 
alist in  criticism  it  is  necessary  to  go  to  the  preceding  century. 
If  by  pseudo-classic  is  meant  the  type  of  mind  which  carries  its 
admiration  for  the  ancients  to  the  point  of  idolatry,  to  the  point 
of  inculcating  a slavish  imitation  of  the  Greeks  and  Latins  and  of 
censuring  departure  from  their  methods,  we  can  best  find  it  in 
Thomas  Ryner." 

Durham  thinks  it  unfair  to  say  that  such  a theory  was  dominant 
in  the  eighteenth  century.  It  is  true  that  side  by  side  with  the 
left-over  ideas  of  the  seventeenth  century  we  find  the  .juster  pro- 
nouncements of  Johnson  in  his  Preface  to  Shakespeare  (before  noted) 
and  again  in  The  Rambler  (Ho.  151).  True,  also,  that  John  Dennis 
ridiculed  Addison's  unity  of  place  in  Oato  (The  Impartial  Critick. 
Spingarn' s Crit ical  Assays  of  the  seventeenth  century . A.  pp.148  - 


* 


-66- 


They  plague  and  haunt  him;  he  must  relinquish  ail  that  he  has 
tried  to  save.  He  has  used  the  rules  to  a purpose  they  will  not 
serve.  He  must  retract;  or  at  least  hedge: 

But  though  it  seems  necessary  to  set  modern 
poets  free  from  a strict  observance  of  these  dramatic 
unities,  yet  we  must  remember  that  there  are  certain 
bounds  to  this  liberty.  Frequent  and  mid  changes  of 
time  and  place;  hurrying  the  spectator  from  one  distant 
city  or  country  to  another;  or  making  several  days  or 
weeks  pass  during  the  course  of  the  representation,  are 
liberties  which  shock  the  imagination,  which  give  the 
performance  a romantic  and  unnatural  appearance,  and 

(Footnote  to  page  65,  continued) 

197)  True  that  Addison  himself  denies  the  rigidity  of  the  ruins  in 
The  Spectator.  (Ho.  592). 

But  it  is  equally  undeniable  that  the  adoration  of 
the  unities  was  dying  hard  with  the  critics  in  general.  Addison 
when  he  came  to  write,  had  followed  the  unities.  Strong  French 
influence  was  felt  in  England,  and  Voltaire  had  planted  himself 
squarely  for  the  "rules"  in  his  Discours  sur  la  Tragedie.  a iiylord 
Bolingbroke  (prefixed  to  Brutus , 1751 ) . 

It  may  be  true,  then,  that  Blair  was  awake  to  the 
opposition  to  the  rules;  but  he  was  equally  awake  to  their  defense. 
Such  an  admission  only  blackens  the  case  still  more  for  the  Doctor. 

"Hurrying  the  spectator  from  one  distant  city  or 
country  to  another,"  and  "making  several  days  or  weeks  to  pass  dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  representation,  *'''**  cannot  be  allowed  in 
any  dramatic  writer  who  aspires  to  correctness,"  says  Blair.  "It 
is  rarely  observed  that  minds,  not  prepossessed  by  mechanical 
criticism,  feel  any  offense  from  the  extension  of  the  intervals 
between  the  acts;  nor  can  I conceive  it  as  absurd  or  impossible, 
that  lie  who  can  multiply  three  hours  into  twelve  or  twenty- four, 
might  imagine,  with  equal  ease,  a greater  number,"  says  Dr.  John- 
son (The  Rambler,  Ho.  156). 

It  is  only  taking  Blair's  excuse  away  from  him,  to 
admit  that  from  English  critics  he  might  have  drawn  the  truth. 


-67- 


therefore  cannot  be  allowed  in  any  dramatic  v.Titer  who 
aspires  to  correctness.  In  particular  we  must  observe 
that  it  is  only  between  acts,  that  any  liberty  can  be 
given  for  going  beyond  the  unities  of  time  and  place. 

During  the  course  of  each  act,  they  ought  strictly  to 
be  observed;  that  is,  during  each  act  the  scene  should 
continue  the  same,  and  no  more  time  should  be  supposed 
to  pass  than  is  employed  in  the  representation  of  that 
act.  This  is  a rule  which  the  French  tragedians  regular- 
ly observe.  To  violate  this  rule,  as  is  too  often  done 
by  the  English;  to  change  the  place  and  shift  the  scene 
in  the  midst  of  one  act,  shows  great  incorrectness,  and 
destroys  the  whole  intention  of  the  division  of  a play 
into  acts.  Mr.  Addi®n*s  Cato  is  remarkable  beyond  most 
English  tragedies,  for  regularity  of  conduct.  The 
author  lias  limited  himself  in  time,  to  a single  day; 
and  in  place,  has  maintained  the  most  rigorous  unity. 

The  scene  is  never  changed;  and  the  whol e action  passes 
in  the  hall  of  Cato^  house,  at  Utica.  (1) 

After  this  final  relapse  on  the  part  of  the  patient, 
there  is  little  need  of  considering  his  case  further.  If  we  can 
catch  him  when  his  fears  of  the  proprieties  are  in  abeyance,  we 
can  often  get  something  of  value  from  him;  something  of  more  value, 
at  least,  than  praise  of  a tragedy  because  of  its  "regularity  of 
conduct."  The  phrase  is  a delicious  one.  It  is  an  almost  irresist- 
ible invitation  to  a pun.  There  was  some  real  and  abiding  merit 
in  what  he  had  to  tell  us  concerning  diction  and  sentence  structure. 

Moreover,  he  could  usually  set  us  the  example  in  his  own  composi- 
tion. One  must  search  for  the  horrible  examples  of  "eloquence" 
quoted  early  in  the  chapter.  But  it  is  clear  that  he  has  nothing 
more  for  us.  We  shall  only  be  pained  at  each  fresh  instance  of  his 


(1)  Lectures,  p.  518. 


, 


* 


-68- 


vacillation.  Let  us  pass  on. 


CAl.jp 3ELL  AUD  HIS  PHILOSOPHY  OP  RHETORIC. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Tlie  third,  and  last,  writer  whom  I have  to  consider, 
is  Dr.  George  Campbell,  Principal  of  the  Marischal  College, 

Aberdeen.  His  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . which  appeared  in  1776,  has 
received  high  praise  from  all  those  who  have  treated  the  subject 
of  rhetoric  and  criticism.  I have  already  quoted  from  Professor 
Millar  concerning  the  value  of  his  work;  (1)  to  this  acclaim 
3e  t there  be  added  the  voice  of  Gregory  Smith,  who  speaks  of  him 
as  "surpassing  Blair."  (2)  And,  if  we  may  add  one  more  testimonial 
let  it  be  that  of  Professor  Baintsbury,  who  lays  it  down  that  the 
Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . "however  much  we  may  disagree  with  occasion- 
al expressions  in  it,  remains  the  most  important  treatise  on  the 
Hew  Rhetoric  (criticism)  that  the  eighteenth  century  produced."  (3) 

How,  if  one  comes  to  the  study  of  Campbell  with  this 
idea  of  his  importance,  he  will  certainly  be  struck  by  this  singular 
circumstance;  that  although  critics  and  literary  historians  are  of 
one  voice  in  acclaiming  the  high  place  of  the  Principal,  they  are 
also  curiously  of  one  disposition  in  their  avoidance  of  treat irg 

(1)  Vide  supra,  p.  35 

(2)  Scottish  Literature,  p.  199 

(3)  A History  of  Critic  ism.  2.  p.  470. 


-70- 

him  in  any  detail.  Gregory  Smith,  indeed,  is  circumscribed  by  the 
limits  of  his  undertaking,  and  has  little  space  either  for  Blair 
or  for  Campbell.  Yet  within  that  space,  the  two  men  receive 
curiously  unequal  treatment.  There  are  five  separate  and 
distinct  references  to  -Blair.  The  name  of  George  Campbell  appears 
but  once,  and  that  in  a statement  that  he  surpassed  Blair. 

Professor  Millar,  v/ho  it  will  be  remembered  called  the  Philosophy 
of  Rhetoric . "the  most  valuable  contribution  to  criticism  which 
came  from  Scotland  during  the  century,”  contents  himself  in  that 
instance  with  a mere  statement  of  the  fact.  Lest  it  be  pleaded  that 
here  too,  the  limits  and  purpose  of  his  work  forbade  any  fuller 
treatment,  let  us  turn  to  his  later  and  more  expanded  consideration 
of  this  period.  In  his  Scottish  Prose  of  the  Seventeenth  and 
Eighteenth  Centuries . we  find  twenty- four  pages  dev  ted  to  Karnes, 
(four  of  them  dealing  particularly  with  Karnes  as  a critic)  (1); 
almost  fourteen  pages  are  devoted  to  an  examination  of  Blair  and 
his  Lectures  (2);  but  when  we  come  to  look  for  Campbell,  we  fiid  that 
he  has  been  given  less  than  a full  page,  with  the  excuse  that  his 
work  "goes  too  much  into  detail  on  many  points  to  admit  of  profit- 
able summary  here.”  (5) 

Professor  Saints bury,  it  would  seem  at  first  sight, 

(1)  Scottish  Prose . pp.  190  ff. 

(2)  ibid,  pp.  2^1  ff 
(3.)  Ibid,  pp.  230-231. 


' 


-71- 


had  gone  t o so  me  pa  ins  t o make  a survey  of  th e Philosophy  ck 
Critic  ism.  His  treatment  of  the  wd  ik.  in  his  Hi  story  of  Ori  tici  sm 
occupies  four  pages,  a generous  allowance  of  space  in  so  crowded 
a volume.  Professor  Saintsbury  is  evidently  bent  upon  establishing 
the  point  that  in  Campbell  we  have  the  true  fusion  of  the  critic 
and  the  rhetorician;  or  rather,  that  Campbell  recognised  that  the 
terms  criticism  and  rhetoric  were  synonymous.  (1)  I must  con- 

fess that  I cannot  agree  that  such  a fusion  of  criticism  and  rhet- 
oric is  any  more  apparent  in  Campbell  than  in  Karnes  and  Blair. 
Indeed,  it  might  almost  be  said  to  be  less  apparent,  though  not 
necessarily  less  real.  Bor  do  I find  that  Professor  Saintsbury 
has  supported  his  thesis  by  his  treatment  of  Campbell’s  work;  a 
treatment  made  up  largely  of  statements  of  opinion,  almost  entirely 
unsupported  by  reference.  Direct  reference,  when  given,  is  almost 
always  to  those  passages  which  the  critic  designates  as  ’’more  ex- 
crescent than  properly  episodic.”  The  passages  which  are  thus 
quoted  as  deviations  from  the  theme  and  purpose  of  the  work,  are 
so  numerous  and  so  extensive  that  just  suspicion  arises  as  to 
Saintsbury1 s estimate* 


(1)  "The  Bew  Rhetoric  --  the  Art  of  Criticism  --  this  is  what 
Campbell  really  attempts."  Saintsbury  (2.  p.  470) 


. 


A direct  comparison  of  the  three  works  under  consider- 
ation in  this  paper,  may  serve  to  point  out  why  Campbell  has  never 
received  adequate  treatment.  The  first  thing  brought  out  by  such 
comparison  is  the  great  difference  in  organization  and  presentation 
of  material  between  Campbell  on  the  one  hand,  and  Karnes  and  Blair 
on  the  other.  Campbell  is  wrriting  a text-book;  Karnes  and  Blair 
are  writing  essays.  The  one  is  preparing  his  material  and  advai  c- 
ing  it  in  the  form  and  order  suggested  by  class  need.  Blair, 
although  making  some  shift  to  do  this  in  the  first  half  of  his 
Lectures,  escapes  from  it  eventually  into  the  happier  region  of 
literary  appreciation.  Karnes  frankly  addresses  the  understanding 
of  those  who  would  criticise.  Campbell  is  addressing  those  who 
create.  It  is  this  text- bo ok  arrangement  and  treatment  — 
which  Professor  Saintsbury  may  have  had  in  mind  when  he  spoke  of’ 
the  "singularly  businesslike  character  of  Campbell's  work"  (1)  — 
that  makes  difficult  any  critical  digest  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Rhetoric. 

Even  metre  than  in  the  mere  natter  of  arrangement  and 
presentation  do  the  three  men  differ  in  their  conceptions  of  the 
subject  to  be  handled.  The  Creeks,  (as  has  been  stated)  had  early 

(1)  History  of  Criticism.  2.  p.  475. 


1 , r >.  > •! 


-73- 

distinguished  between  two  main  branches  of  the  literary  art;  the 
useful  , and  the  ornamental;  or  rhetoric  and  poetics . However 
vague  the  boundaries  between  these  two  divisions  might  have  been 
in  actual  practice,  and  however  much  the  lb  rely  useful  branch  of 
the  art  had  encroached  upon  the  territory  of  the  more  purely 
literary  art,  the  distincti  on  was  nevertheless  important.  The 
province  of  the  orator  was  that  species  of  composition,  the 
purpose  of  which  is  to  persuade  or  enlighten.  His  art  was  the  art 
of  rhetoric.  The  more  purely  literary  artist  reserved  for  himself 
the  drama  and  the  epic,  together  with  those  lesser  compositions 
best  designated  by  the  title  lyric ; and  his  art  was  the  art  of 
poetics.  In  this  distinction  we  have  found  the  means  of  interpret- 
ing the  work  of  Campbell;,  and,  indeed,  of  all  three  men. 

Karnes  was  interested,  chiefly,  in  finding  those 
basic  principles  in  human  nature  which  act  as  the  ultimate  and 
universal  standards  of  taste,  ^rom  the  nature  of  his  inquiry,  he 
was  led  into  a consideration  of  those  forms  of  literary  expression 
identified  as  poe  tics . Hven  his  chapters  on  composition  and  word 
values  are  concerned  primarily  with  sense  impressions.  Scarcely, 
if  at  all,  does  he  invade  the  province  of  the  more  strictly  useful 
branch  of  the  art.  His  study  might  justly  be  termed  an  essay  on  the 
psychology  of  aesthetics.  Blair,  building  upon  Hames,  re-affirms 
his  principles  with  but  slight  modifications.  In  neither  his 
remarks  upon  taste  or  his  literary  appreciations  in  the  latter  half 


-74- 


of  his  Lectures  does  he  encroach  upon  the  province  of  the  older 
rhe toric.  In  his  remarks  upon  style  and  his  subsequent  examination 
of  specimens  of  Swift,  Addison,  etc.,  he  sL  ips  over  the  boundary 
for  a time.  Particularly  is  this  true  when  his  emphasis  is  upon 
mere  matters  of  perspicuity  and  accuracy;  his  consideration  of 
style,  in  its  more  highly  literary  aspects,  might  justly  be  claimed 
by  either  of  the  two  arts,  even  as  in  practice  the  orator  must 
often  avail  himself  of  the  art  of  poetics . 

Campbell,  however,  approaches  his  task  with  the 
Aristotelian  distinction  (l)  clearly  in  mind.  What  Professor 
Eaintsbury  has  chosen  to  designate  as  his  "Aristotelian  relapses" 
(2),  are,  it  seems  to  the  present  writer,  far  from  "relapses".  They 
are  in  the  main  body  of  the  work;  integral  parts  of  a plan  most 
strictly  classic  in  its  conception  of  rhetoric  as  being  a useful, 
rather  than  an  ornamental,  art.  Hot  that  the  Principal  intends  to 
blind  himself  to  the  value  of  the  art  of  poetics  as  a necessary  and 


( 1 ) Aristotle  on  the  art  of  Poetry , a revised  text  with  critical 
introducti on,  translation,  and  c ommentary . by  Ingram  Bywater  (1909) 
p7"lT*  ''Out  subject  being  Poetry,  I propose  to  speak  not  only  of 
the  art  in  general  but  also  of  its  species  and  their  respective 
capacities  ....  Epic  Poetry  and  Tragedy,  as  also  Comedy,  -oithyrambic 
poetry,  and  most  flute-playing  and  lyre-playing,  are  all  viewed  as 
a whole,  modes  of  imitation." 

T]ie_  rhetoric  of  Aristotle  r translated  wi th  an  analysis 
and  critical  notes,  by  J.  E.  0.  Uelldon  11886),  p.  10:"Hhetoric  may 
be  defined  as  a faculty  of  discovering  all  the  possible  means  of  per- 
suasion in  any  subject." 

(2t  History  of  Criticism,  v.  11,  p.  470. 


-75- 


uaefu.1  adjunct  to  the  art  of  the  orator.  "Poetry,"  says  he, 

"is  properly  no  other  than  a particular  mode  or  form  of  certain 
branches  of  oratory."  (1)  Poetics . he  will  admit  as  handmaiden  of 
rhetoric . but  its  subordinate  position  in  his  plan  is  intimated  by 
the  words  "certain  branches  of  oratory."  Uor  do  we  have  to  remain 
long  satisfied  with  oere  intimation.  The  Principal  becomes  explicit. 
In  acknowledging  his  own  debt  to  .Karnes,  he  takes  occasion  to  com- 
pare his  present  aim  with  that  of  the  Elements . and  to  point  out 
exactly  where  the  two  part  company.  In  Karnes^  work,  he  says, 
the  various  fine  arts  "are  examined  only  on  that  side  wherein 
there  is  found  a pretty  considerable  coincidence  with  one  another; 
namely,  as  objects  of  taste,  which  by  exciting  sentiments  of 
grandeur,  beauty,  novelty,  and  the  like,  are  calculated  to  deLight 
the  imagination.  In  this  view,  eloquence  comes  no  farther  under 
consideration  than  as  a fine  art,  and  adapted  like  the  others  above 
mentioned,  to  please  the  fancy  and  move  the  passions.  But  to  Treat 
it  als<o  as  a useful  art,  and  closely  connected  with  the  understand- 
ing and  will,  would  have  led  to  a discussion  foreign  to  his  pur- 
pose." (2).  That  Campbell  purposed  to  treat  of  eloquence  as  a use- 
ful art,  and  that  he  kept  faithfully  to  his  purpose,  is  evidenced  in 

(1)  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  p.  18,  American  edition,  1871. 

(2)  Ibid,  p.  21. 


-76- 


eve  ry  page  of  Ms  work,  and  I know  not  how  Professor  Saintsbury 
could  justly  terra  those  passages  "excrescent"  , which  are  so  clearly 
the  very  workings-out  of  this  program.  (1) 

Campbell  has  divided  his  treatise  into  three  parts: 
"The  nature  and  foundations  of  eloquence;  the  foundations  and  es- 
sential properties  of  elocution;”  and,  "the  discriminating  properties 
of  elocution."  However  well  these  divisions  may  have  been  adapted 
to  class  presentation,  they  do  not  afford  us  the  readiest  means  of 
estimating  his  work.  We  shall  therefore  content  ourselves  with 
noting  them,  --  and  then  forgetting  them.  In  their  place  we  shall 


(1)  It  should  be  noted  that  my  perplexity  is  not  that  Professor 
Saintsbury  should  take  exception  to  those  passages  which  he  mentions. 
They  are  invariably  passages  in  wMch  Campbell  indulges  with  Karnes 
in  attempts  at  analysing  human  nature.  My  wonder  is  that  Professor 
Saintsbury  should  have  considered  these  as  foreign  to  the  purpose 
of  the  Philos ophy  of  Rhetoric.  The  Professor’s  objection  to  any 
psychological  basis  for  criticism  is  too  well  known  to  need  much 
comment.  Being  firmly  of  the  opinion  that  ethics  have  nothing  to 
do  with  literature,  he  looks  askance  at  any  study  vh  ich  has  the 
appearance  of  assigning  a common  origin  to  morals  and  emotions. 

To  the  repeated  assurances  of  Karnes  and  Campbell  that  they  are  not 
confusing  mo  mis  and  taste  he  gives  scant  attention.  Karnes  has 
already  been  quoted;  let  Oampoeil  speak  in  his  own  defense: 

"Are  we  then  to  class  the  virtues  among  the  passions?  By  no 
means (Yet)  although  not  passions,  they  are  so  closely  relat- 

ed to  them,  that  they  are  properly  considered  as  motives  to  action, 
being  equally  capable  of  giving  an  impulse  to  the  will." 

Object  as  he  may  to  any  consideration  of  virtue  as  applied  to 
literary  criticism,  surely  Professor  Saintsbury  need  not  object  to 
the  use  of  virtue  as  a main-spring  of  action  in  the  art  of  oratory. 
Kor  would  he  object,  in  my  opinion,  had  he  firmly  grasped  the  pur- 
pose of  the  author  of  the  Philosophy  o f Rhetoric . 


- 


. 


-77- 

substitute  three  divisions  of  our  om ; namely. convi ct ion,  persuasion 
and  composition.  The  first  two  of  these  have  always  "been  considered 
as  complementary  elements  in  the  art  of  the  orator.  Together,  they 
are  said  to  comprise  the  art  of  argument . The  last  of  the  three 
divisions,  composit ion,  lies  upon  the  border-line  between  rhetoric 
and  poetics . It  is  pre-empted  now  by  the  one,  now  by  the  other,  ac- 
cording to  whether  the  aim  be  to  enlighten  or  to  please.  With 
Campbell,  the  ultimate  aim  is  always  to  enlighten,  although  he  recog- 
nizes the  fact  that  to  enlighten,  one  must  often  amuse,  or  at  least 
enlist  the  sympathies  by  interest. 

Convict  ion,  as  treated  by  all  writers  on  oratory,  is 
said  to  deal  with  those  matters  which  make  their  appeal  to  the  under- 
standing of  man,  as  distinguished  from  his  emotions.  Its  instrument 
is  logic.  What  says  Principal  Campbell?  "The  sole  and  ultimate 
end  of  logic  is  the  eviction  of  truth;  one  important  end  of 
eloquence  ***+  is  the  conviction  of  the  hearers."  (l)  Therefore, 
Campbell  dwells  at  some  length  upon  the  reasoning  processes  of  man. 
But,  he  adds,  "Rhetoric,  as  was  observed  already,  not  only  considers 

(1)  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . p.  54 


■ 


♦ 

* 


' 


-78- 


the  subject,  but  also  the  hearers  and  the  speaker."  (1)  This  is 
a matter  for  persuasion.  Consequently,  the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric 
has  much  to  say  concerning  the  passions  and  emotions  which  may  be 
enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  orator,  finally,  the  importance  of 
composition  and  its  relation  to  oratory  is  noted(2):  "Eloquence 

hath  always  been  considered,  and  very  justly,  as  having  a particular 
connexion  with  language . It  is  the  intention  of  eloquence  to  od  n- 
vey  our  sentiments  into  the  minds  of  others,  in  order  to  produce 
a certain  effect  upon  them,  language  is  the  only  vehicle  by  which 
this  conveyance  can  be  made.  The  art  of  speaking,  then,  is  not 
less  necessary  to  the  orator  than  the  art  of  thinking." 

So  important  does  Campbell  consider  this  art  of 
speaking,  that  fully  two  thirds  of  his  volume  are  devoted  to  it. 

In  this  v/ilderness  of  rules  of  grammar,  diction,  and  verbal 
criticism,  a reviewer  may  well  lose  himself.  Pull  treatment,  or 
indeed,  any  adequate  treatment,  becomes  as  difficult  as  the  task 
of  revi  ewing  any  manual  of  composition.  It  would  scarcely  be  a 
greater  feat  to  give  a literary  estimate  of  Woolley’s  Handbook  of 
Composition.  This  may,  indeed,  be  the  best  of  excuses  for  its 
neglect  by  certain  chroniclers  of  literary  history;  but  that  the 

(1  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . p.  95 
(fc)  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  p.  162. 


, 


-79- 


distinction  of  having  compiled  a good  practical  handbook  of  com- 
position, is  sufficient  warrant  for  elevating  Campbell  into  an 
apostle  of  "the  Hew  Criticism"  (whatever  that  may  be),  appears 
doubtful  to  the  present  writer.  Either  Karnes  or  Blair  would  seem 
to  have  better  title  to  the  appellation  critic . 

Beginning  his  work  with  the  public  speaker  in  mind, 
Campbell  makes  preliminary  division  of  the  field  into  serious 
or  grave  speaking,  and  the  lighter  or  humorous  manner.  Sublimity, 
vehemence,  and  pathos  are  listed  as  the  weapons  of  the  former  type, 
and  their  natures  are  investigated  somewhat  after  the  manner  of 
Karnes.  Much  more  thoroughly  in  the  spirit  and  manner  of  Karnes  is 
the  discussion  of  wit,  humor,  and  ridicule;  herein  Campbell  ex- 
amines into  the  causes  of  laughter,  noting  theories  of  Aristotle 
and  Hobbes,  and  professing  himself  in  general  accord  with  that  of 
Aristotle,  while  heartily  opposed  to  that  of  Hobbes.  (1) 

Next  fo Hows  a discussion  of  the  relation  which 
eloquence  bears  to  logic  and  grammer,  in  the  course  of  which 
Campbell  deals  a lusty  blow  as  the  "scholastic  art  of  syllogizing." 
Speaking  of  this  last.  Professor  Baintsbury  says  that  in  this 
discussion  Campbell  "wrecks  himself  in  a galley  which  he  had  not 

(1)  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . pp.  50-54 


■ 


-80- 


the  slightest  need  to  enter."  (1)  I am  at  a loss  to  know  exactly 
what  is  meant  by  this  statement.  If  it  he  intended  as  a disagree- 
ment with  the  findings  of  Campbell,  that  is  a matter  of  opinion; 
and  against  Professor  Saintsbury’s  judgment  will  he  ranged  not 
only  the  judgment  of  Campbell,  but  of  John  Otuart  Mill,  whose 
discussion  of  the  syllogism  is  at  many  points  in  accord  with  that 
of  Campbell.  (2)  But  if  by  "wrecking  himself"  Professor  Saintsbury 
intended  to  indicate  only  that  Campbell  had  departed  from  his  orig- 
inal scheme  and  intention,  the  matter  refers  itself  to  that  differ- 
ence of  opinion,  before  noted,  as  to  what  was  the  exact  purpose  and 
plan  of  the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . 


(1)  Hi  story  of  Criticism,  v.  II,  p.  471. 

(2)  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric . p.  88.  Speaking  of  the  fallacy  of 

petit io  principii . which  logicians  have  been  at  great  pains  to  warn 
against,  and  have  designated  as  a sophism.  Campbell  says:  "It  is 

surprising  that  this  should  ever  have  been  by  those  artists  styled 

a sophism,  since  it  is,  in  fact,  so  essential  to  the  art,  that  there 
is  always  some  radical  defect  in  a syllogism  which  is  not  chargeable 
with  this." 

For  Mill’s  recognition  of  the  fallacy  of  petitio  principii  im- 
plicit in  every  syllogism  considered  as  a means  of  argument  to  arrive 
at  a new  truth  (identical  with  Campbell’s  objection  to  the  syllogism 
as  a means  of  inference)  see  Mill’s  Logic . pp.  122  and  following. 
(London  1906) 


-81- 


Having  treated  of  men  as  creatures  of  understanding, 
and  thus  having  disposed  of  convi ction.  Campbell  advances  to  treat 
of  man  as  a creature  of  emotion.  This  is  a matter  for  persuasion, 
and  in  his  analysis  of  the  subject,  he  perforce  turns  philosopher, 
and  calls  into  consultation  such  eminent  practitioners  as  Abb 4 du 
Bois  (1),  Fontenelle  (2),  Hume  (£),  and  Hobbes  (4).  With  none  of 
these  is  he  in  perfect  accord,  and  he  verts  out  for  himself  "in  that 
debatable  ground  between  literature  and  Ethics"  an  explanation- of 
various  emotional  processes  of  man,  which  are  again  Kamesian  in 
their  method  if  not  in  their  actual  findings. 

The  reader  has  now  arrived  at  that  point  where  Camp- 
bell begins  his  treatment  of  composition.  A glance  at  the  table  of 
contents  (which  is  made  up  of  such  headings  as:  "Of  the  Qualities 
of  Style  strictly  Rhetorical;  of  Perspicuity;  The  Obscure  — from 
Defect,  from  Bad  Arrangement,  from  Using  the  -Same  Word  in  Different 
Senses,  from  An  Uncertain  Reference  in  Pronouns  and  Relatives,  from 
Too  Artificial  a Structure  of  the  Sentences,  Etc.  Etc.)  will  re- 
assure the  student  that  any  complete  treatment  of  this  remaining 
part  of  the  work  would  be  impracticable,  unless  as  a revision  of  a 

( 1 ) P.6  flexions  Critiques  sur  la  Po6sie  et  sur  la  Pe  injure . 

(2)  D~ei l£xi oris  sur  la  Podtique  ♦ 

(5)  Essay  on  Tragedy. 

(4)  Human  Nature. 


\ I • 


“ 


-82- 


a manual  of  composition.  Such  a revision  lies  neither  within  the 
purpose  nor  the  power  of  the  present  writer. 

Yet  to  suffer  fully  two  thirds  of  the  work  to  go 
untouched  would  be  embarrassing.  Moreover,  scattered  throughout 
the  rules  and  their  application,  may  be  found  such  oo  mmon- sense 
and  practical  justification  for  their  use,  as  in  itself  merits 
attention.  It  is  this  just  and  logical  defense  of  his  rules,  and 
the  undeniable  acuteness  and  general  correctness  of  his  taste,  which, 
I tahe  it,  has  commended  Campbell  particularly  to  those  who  have 
praised  him  highly.  A steady  diet  of  Karnes,  with  his  subtleties 
which  are  not  always  certain,  and  his  inductions  which  do  not 
uniformly  induce,  may  we 11  make  a man  relish  a generous  dose  of 
the  practical.  In  the  latter  part  of  his  work  Campbell  abandons 
to  a great  extent  the  abstruse  and  the  philosophic,  and  calls  in 
common  sense  to  enforce  his  precepts.  Such  is  the  defense  which  he 
brings  to  the  support  of  his  nine  canons  of  verbal  criticism,  vhich 
Professor  Saintsbury  praises  so  highly,  and  which  I append  in  a 


1 


♦ 

.. 


-83- 


footnote.  (1)  After  so  often  having  been  forced  to  take  exception 
to  Professor  Saint s bur y* s remarks,  it  is  with  the  greater  pleasure 
that  I find  myself  in  accord  with  his  opinion  concerning  tliese 
canons,  when  he  says  that  they  are  "in  the  main  so  sound  and  so 
acute  that  they  are  not  obsolete  to  the  present  day."  (2) 


(l)  I.  When  use  is  divided  as  to  any  particular  word  or  phrase, 
and  the  expression  used  by  one  part  hath  been  preoccupied,  or  is 
in  any  instance  susceptible  of  a different  signification,  and  the 
expression  employed  by  the  other  part  never  admits  a different  sense, 
both  perspicuity  and  variety  require  that  the  form  of  expression 
which  is  in  every  instance  strictly  uni vocal  be  preferred. 

II.  In  doubtful  cases  regard  ought  to  be  had  to  the  analogy  of 
the  language. 

III.  When  terms  or  expressions  are  in  other  respects  equal , 
that  ought  to  be  preferred  which  is  most  agreeable  to  the  ear. 

IV.  In  cases  wherein  none  of  the  foregoing  rules  gives  either 
side  ground  for  preference,  a regard  to  the  simplicity  (in  which  I 
include  etymology  when  manifest)  ought  to  determine  our  choice. 

V.  In  the  few  cases  wherein  neither  perspicuity  nor  analogy, 
neither  sound  nor  simplicity,  assists  us  in  the  fixing  our  choice, 
it  is  safest  to  prefer  that  manner  which  is  most  conformable  to 
ancient  usage. 

VI.  All  words  and  phrases  which  are  remarkably  harsh  and  un- 
harmonious,  and  not  absolutely  necessary,  may  justly  be  judged 
worthy  of  this  fate  (i.e.,  of  being  dropped  from  use). 

VII.  When  etymology  plainly  points  to  a signification  different 
from  that  which  the  word  commonly  bears,  propriety  and  simplicity 
both  require  its  dismission. 

VIII.  When  any  words  become  obsolete,  or  at  least,  are  never 
used  except  at  constituting  parts  of  particular  phrases,  it  is  better 
to  dispense  with  their  service  entirely,  and  give  up  the  phrases. 

IX.  All  those  phrases  which,  when  analyzed  grammatically , in- 
clude a solecism,  and  all  those  to  which  use  hath  affixed  a particu- 
lar sense,  but  which,  when  explained  by  the  general  and  established 
rules  of  the  language , are  susceptible  either  of  a different  sense 
or  of  no  sense,  ought  to  be  discarded  altogether. 

(2f  History  of  Criticism,  v II,  p.  472. 


, 


' 


. 


-84- 


As  representative  of  the  many  instances  of  just  and 
sensible  reasoning  by  the  Principal,  I shall  produce  his  warning' 
against  silly  and  indiscriminate  attempts  to  improve  the  lar  guage. 
He  is  speaking  in  particular  against  the  practice  of  attempting  to 
eject  old  and  established  forms  of  words  adapted  from  foreign 
tongues,  and  to  substitute  in  their  places  forms  Y/hose  only  claim 
is  that  they  are  closer  approximations  of  the  foreign  word. 

"Again:  why  this  reformation  should  be  confined 

almost  entirely  to  proper  names,  for  my  part  I can  discover 
no  good  reason.  Appellatives  are  doubtless  entitled  to  a 
share.  Critics  of  this  stamp  ought,  for  example,  boldly  to 
resolve,  in  spite  of  the  inveterate  abuses  and  plebeian  pre- 
judices, never,  while  they  breath,  either  to  write  or  to  pro- 
nounce the  words,  pope . popery,  and  popedom,  but  instead  of 
them  pape . pape ry . and  papedom;  since  whether  we  derive 
these  words  immediately  from  the  French,  the  Latin,  or  the 
Greek,  still  it  appears  that  the  o_  is  but  a base  usurper 
of  a place  which  rightfully  belongs  to  the  a.  The  reason 
assigned  for  saying  Koran,  and  not  Alcoran,  is  truly  curious. 
Al,  say  they,  is  the  Arabic  article,  and  signifies  the : con- 
sequently, if  we  should  say  the  Alcoran,  we  should  fall  into 
a gross  perissology.  It  is  just  as  if  we  said  the  the  book. 

A plain  illiterate  man  would  think  it  sufficient  to  reply. 

What  though  al  signifies  the  in  Arabic,  it  hath  no  sig- 
nification in  English,  and  is  only  here  the  first  syllable 
of  a name  which  use  hath  appropriated,  no  matter  how,  to  a 
particular  book.  But  if  ye  who  are  such  deep  scholars  and 
wonderful  improvers  of  your  mother-tongue,  are  determined  to 
exclude  this  harmless  syllable  from  Alcoran,  act  at  least 
consistently,  and  dismiss  it  also  from  alchymy . alcove . 
alembic . algebra . almanac . and  all  the  other  words  in  the 
language  that  are  derived  in  the  same  way,  and  from  the 
same  source.  Indeed  it  is  not  easy  to  say  where  ye  will 
stop}  for  if  ye  attend  to  it,  ye  will  find  many  words  of 
Latin  or  French  origin  which  stand  equally  in  need  of  re- 
formation." (1) 


(1)  The  Philosophy  of  Hhetoric . p.  200. 


f 


f 


-86- 


.tfow  that  I have  come  to  take  leave  of  Campbell,  I 
note  with  mixed  emotions  that  like  all  others  vho  have  attempted  to 
treat  his  work,  I have  relatively  slighted  him  in  space.  There  is, 
however,  some  source  of  satisfaction  to  me  in  that  I have  nowhere 
committed  myself  as  whole-heartedly  to  that  exaltation  of  his  im- 
portance which  lias  embarrassed  others  when  they  came  to  treat  of  him. 
As  a teacher  of  composition  he  is,  of  course , far-and-away  ahead  of 
Karnes;  and  in  the  detail  and  extent  of  his  directions  for  compo- 
sition, I suppose  he  excels  Blair.  If  his  importance  be  rated, 
then,  by  his  achievements  in  the  field  of  pedagogy  and  composition, 

I must  agree  that  he  overtops  them.  But  I can  see  little  reason 
to  enter  into  a relative  estimate  of  the  three  men,  if  in  this 
estimate  we  do  not  clearly  recognise  the  fact  that  their  aims  and 


(Footnote  to  page  85,  continued.) 

standing  (1)  the  proper  use  of  the  voice  for  expression  of  the 
several  emotions,  i.e.,  when  it  should  be  loud  or  low  or  intermed- 
iate; (2)  the  proper  use  of  the  accents,  i.  e.  when  the  tone  should 
be  acute  or  grave  or  intermediate,  and  (£)  the  rhythms  suitable  to 
each  emotion  

’’The  art  of  declamation,  when  it  comes,  into  vogue, 
will  produce  the  same  effects  as  the  histrionic  art;  the  truth 

is  that  a capacity  for  declaiming  or  acting  is  a natural  gift,  com- 
paratively free  from  artistic  regulations,  although  it  may  be  re- 
duced to  an  art  in  its  application  to  style."  The  Rhetoric  of 
Aristotle . translated  with  an  analysis  and  critical  notes,  by  J.  a. 
G.  Welldon,  pp.  225-227, 

Longinus  and  Cicero  treat  somewhat  of  delivery  with 
respect  to  action;  but  the  present  day  treatises  in  which  the 
importance  of  delivery  is  greatly  stressed  not  only  as  helpful  orna- 
ment for  thought,  but  a a direct  stimulus  and  formative  influence 
upon  thought,  are  based  upon  a psychology  unknown  to  the  ancients. 


. 


« 


-87- 


purposes  were  far  from  identical;  and  that  the  first  two  were  in 
spirit  critics  of  the  fine  arts,  whereas  the  last  was  first  and 
always  an  exponent  of  the  useful  art. 


RECAPITULATION  AND  INTERPRETATION. 


CHAPTER  V. 


Intimate  and  details d treatment  of  any  subject  is  apt 
to  induce  in  the  mind  of  the  writer  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the  im- 
portance of  that  subject.  It  would  be  folly  to  maintain  that  either 
Names  or  Blair  has  exercised  any  great  influence  upon  the  progress 
of  rhetoric  and  criticism.  Campbell  has  had  better  fortune . Less 
popular  originally  than  the  others  he,  nevertheless,  outlasted  them. 
The  reasons  in  each  case  are  fairly  obvious.  Names  appealed  to  his 
times  by  his  speculative  psychology;  to  this  apical  Blair  added 
that  of  ’’elegance”.  Modem  methods  of  research  have  rendered  the 
one  antiquated;  modern  taste  has  pronounced  the  other  "distasteful” 
Campbell,  on  the  other  hand,  though  indulging  with  Names  in  sone  ab- 
stractions, by  no  means  emphasizes  speculative  methods  in  the  same 
degree.  _ I have  noted  that  his  treatment  of  composition  (fully  two- 
thirds  of  his  volume)  is  logical  (1)  rather  than  philosophic.  Nor 
was  he  as  "elegant"  a writer  as  Blair.  The  lach  of  those  qualities 

(1)  Not  in  the  same  sense  as  the  word  has  been  applied  to  Whately's 
Rhetoric . London, ( 18£8 ) . Campbell,  indeed,  was  decidedly  suspicious 
of  formal  logic  as  treated  by  the  scholiasts.  He  was  logical , rather 
in  his  methods  of  justifying  his  rules  by  appeals  to  common  sense, 
which  some  have  thought  to  be  the  soul  of  true  logic,  and  ai peri  or 
to  most  systems  of  logic. 


-89- 

which  might  have  endeared  him  to  his  own  age,  recommended  him  to  the 
next;  and  if  his  book  has  at  length  yielded  to  successors,  his 
theories  of  composition  remain  in  the  pages  of  the  modern  text. 

But  if  few  direct  traces  of  Karnes  and  Blair  remain  to- 
day, they  were  none  the  less  prophetic  of  the  coming  aesthetic  crit- 
icism. A reasoned  and  rational  aestheticism  is  the  attempt  of  Karnes, 
and,  after  him,  of  Blair.  What  Ao  men  like,  and  why  do  they  like  it? 
Addison  had  done  something  of  the  sort  before  in  his  Pleasures  of 
the  Imagination,  but  never  to  the  extent  to  which  the  matter  was  car- 
ried by  these  two  Scots.  If  then  I cannot  claim  for  them  that  crown 
of  critical  approbation,  "influence",  nevertheless  I may  accord  them 
a distinction  second  only,  in  academic  circles,  to  "influence".  They 
were  "significant".  Let  us  summarize  their  signif icance . 

Fired  with  the  passion  of  explaining  things,  a passion 
characteristic ■ of  the  times  and  of  Boots  in  particular,  Karnes  pro- 
poses to  elucidate  the  grounds  of  all  criticism.  He  will  seek  these 
grounds  or  principles  "in  their  true  source,"  human  nature.  Although 
he  professes  to  deal  with  all  the  fine  arts,  his  natural  bent  and 
the  prevalent  absorbing  interest  in  English  language  and  literature 
lead  him  to  consider  literature  mainly.  His  method  of  procedure  is 
to  be  inductive,  which  means  that  he  will  gather  facts  of  individual 
preference  and  from  these  arrive  at  his  general  canons.  This  laud- 
able resolve  to  confine  himself  to  a posteriori  reasoning  suffers  at 
times,  it  is  to  be  feared,  from  insidious  encroachments  of  certain 


' 

. 


■ 


. 


-90- 

a priori  postulates.  (1)  But  regardless  of  its  success,  the 

attempt  to  ground  criticism  upon  human  nature  is  praiseworthy. 
Rhetoric,  "the  art  of  ascertaining  the  available  means  of  persua- 
sion," though  susceptible  of  treatment  upon  this  basis,  is  slighted 
by  Karnes  in  his  more  immedi ate  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  various 
means  of  giving  pleasure.  He  lays,  then,  a basis  for  either  Rhetoric 
or  Poetics,  but  deals  with  the  latter  only. 

Blair,  assenting  to  Karnes1 s element s of  critical 
judgment,  applies  them  in  some  measure  to  the  appreciation  of  lit- 
erature. The  words  "in  some  measure"  should  be  emphasized;  for  he 
was  influence^,  in  far  greater  degree  than  was  Karnes,  by  what,  in  iiis 
opinion,  it  was  pro  .er  to  think  about  literature.  Rhetoric,  the  use- 
ful art,  received  little  attention  from  him.  His  lectures  upon 
elocution  deal  mainly  with  consideration  of  diction.  In  matters  of 
composition  he  taught  wisely,  ancj. , all  things  considered,  his  prac- 
tice was  not  discreditable  to  his  theory. 

In  Campbell  we  hark  back  to  Aristotle,  --  at  least  in 
the  union  of  persuasion  and  composition.  The  persuasive  purpose  of 
Rhetoric  is  restated;  its  function  as  a useful  art  is  reasserted. 

(1)  Elements,  1.  p.  77,  "I  love  my  daughter  less  after  she  is  mar- 
ried, and  my  mother  less  after  a second  marriage;  the  marriage  of 
my  son  or  my  father  diminishes  not  my  affection  so  remarkably," 

Taken  with  its  context,  this  has  a suspicious  appearance  of  fitting 
fact  to  the  theory  it  is  supposed  to  illustrate. 


-91- 


In  its  study  of  persuasive  methods  the  Biiiio  sophy  of  Rhetoric  is 
directly  inspired  by  the  psychology  of  the  Elements  of  Criti cisra; 
although  this  must  not  be  taken  as  denying  originality  of  thought 
to  Campbell,  hot  only  did  he  adopt  the  method;  he  adapted  it.  To 
the  matter  of  co imposition . or  diction,  he  gave  it  little  application; 
its  value  to  the  speaker  lay  in  its  determining  what  to  say,  not  how 
to  say  it.  And  finally,  of  both  Blair  and  Campbell  it  should  be  said 
that  they  were  remarkably  at  one  with  Aristotle  in  this  respect,  — 
although  they  were  both  teachers  of  public  speaking,  they  taught  any- 
thing but  speaking.  (1) 

But  if  Campbell  harked  back  to  the  sources  of  Rhetoric 
for  his  union  of  content  and  style,  he  was,  nevertheless,  so  far  in- 
fluenced by  the  prevailing  interest  in  diction  as  to  reverse  the 


(1)  In  his  realisation  of  the  problems  of  the  speaker  as  distinguish- 
ed from  those  of  the  writer,  Blair,  although  farther  from  the  ancient 
Rhetoric . is  nearer  than  Campbell  to  modern  teaching.  Bays  he 
(Lectures,  pp. 382-385);  --  There  is  one  observation  which  it  isof  im- 
portance to  make,  concerning  imitation  of  style  of  any  favourite 
ahthor,  when  we  would  carry  his  style  into  public  speaking.  We  must 
attend  to  a very  material  distinction  between  written  and  spoken 
language  . There  are,  in  truth,  two  different  manners  of  communicat- 
ing ideas.  A book  that  is  to  be  read  requires  one  style:  a man  that 

is  to  speak,  must  use  another.  In  books,  we  look  for  correctness,  pre- 
cision, all  redundancy  pruned,  all  repetitions  avoided,  language  com- 
pletely polished.  Speaking  admits  a more  copious  easy  style,  an 
less  fettered  by  rule;  repetitions  may  often  be  necessary,  paren- 
thesis may  sometimes  be  graceful,  the  same  thought  must  often  be 
placed  in  different  views;  as  the  hearers  can  catch  it  only  from  the 
mouth  of  the  speaker,  and  have  not  the  advantage,  as  in  reading  a bool 
of  turning  back  again,  and  of  dwelling  on  what  they  do  not  comprehend, 
Hence  the  style  of  many  good  authors,  would  appear  stiff,  affected, 
and  even  obscure,  if,  by  too  close  an  imitation,  we  should  transfer 
it  to  a popular  oration."  To  all  of  which  we  cry  "Bravo i"  Yet  we 
note  with  sorrow,  that  content  with  this  one  note  of  warning,  Blair 
everywhere  else  treats  of  the  style  of  written  discourse. 


, 


t , 


-92- 


•< 

Aristotelian  distribution  of  form  and  substance.  Two  of  the  three 
bo olis  of  the  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric  deal  with  composition:  and  — be 
it  noted  — with  written  composition.  Thus,  in  spite  of  his  efforts 
to  treat  of  Rhetoric . he  fell  into  the  hands  of  those  who  would  sub- 
stitute for  the  art  of  persuasion,  the  mere  mechanics  of  writing. 

The  modern  tendency  in  Rhetoric . all  such  things  as 
"long  expositions"  and  "long  arguments"  notwithstanding,  has  been 
and  continues  to  be  a stressing  of  diction,  sentence  structure,  — 
and  the  paragraph.  Such  stress  at  some  period  is  certainly  essen- 
tial to  a mastery  of  language  and  discourse.  Just  what  period  shall 
receive  this  stress,  and  in  just  what  course  students  shall  receive 
instructions  in  thinking,  continue  to  be  the  vexed  questions.  Per- 
haps the  modern  Universities  would  answer  the  question  after  this 
manner:  that  if  the  whole  of  knowledge  is  the  province  of  the 

orator,  let  him  get  his  theory  of  thinking  from  a course  in  logic ; 
let  him  practice  his  thinking  in  every  other  course;  for  his  in- 
struction in  the  rudiments  of  persuasion  let  him  register  in  psy- 
chology : and  if  he  wo  uld  practice  persuasion,  let  him  enroll  in  a 

class  of  argumentation.  Is, then,  the  modern  University  after  all  a 
school  of  training  in  Aristotelian  Rhetoric? 

In  a very  important , but  a very  limited  sense,  yes. 
Modem  specialization  lias  rendered  easy  a thorough  grounding  for 
Rhetoric . but  as  knowledge  does  not  necessarily  make  for  wisdom. 


1 


-93- 

so  the  sum-total  of  university  courses  does  not  constitute  Rhetoric . 
Nothing  was  clearer  to  the  founder  of  the  art  than  the  necessity  for 
instruction  in  the  method  of  bringing  all  knowledge  to  bear  upon  per- 
suasion. This  instruction  constituted  the  art  of  Rhetoric . How  ever, 
necessary  and  valuable  the  courses  of  composition  may  be,  they  are 
not  Rhetoric . It  i s irony  indeed,  that  Campbell  --  the  one  man  of 
our  three  who  really  approached  treating  the  art  of  the  Stagirite  — 
should  have  given  added  impulse  to  the  mistake  of  identifying 
Rhetoric  with  compositi on.  His  treatment  of  diction  was  too  good. 

It  quite  overshadowed  the  other  elements  of  his  work  in  the  minis  of 
those  who  followed.  It  is  not  suggested  that  courses  in  the  mechan- 
ics of  writing  should  be  eliminated;  they  are  valuable  so  far  as 
they  go;  but  "preoccupation  with  style  is  not  the  mood  in 

which  either  to  teach  or  to  learn  the  best  lessons  of  Rhetoric."  (1) 


(1)  C.  S.  Baldwin,  article  on  Rhetoric . konroe's  Cyclopedia 
Education.  1913,  vol.  5 


_ 


- 


' 


-94- 


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